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"Not in My Back Yard!"
Restrictive Covenants as a Basis for
Opposing the Construction of Cellular
Towers
CAROL R. GOFORTHt

In the past few years, all across the country, the
telecommunications industry has been constructing towers to
provide cellular phone services in record numbers.' In fact,
this industry has built so many of these "cell towers" that
some observers have dubbed it "the pin-cushioning" of
America.2 Other commentators have complained that the
unsightly
towers are appearing "like mushrooms after the
3
rain.

Putting aside the objectionable aesthetics of the
situation, one might wonder why this phenomenon would
engender much concern or comment. Yet there is growing
t Arkansas Bar Foundation Professor of Law, University of Arkansas; B.A., 1981,
University of Arkansas; J.D., 1984, University of Arkansas.
1. The Federal Communications Commission estimates that the U.S. currently
has approximately 22,000 cell towers serving more than 30 million customers. See
Tux Turkel, Towering Issue as Wireless Communication Expands, Thousands of
New Antennas Are on the Horizon, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 26, 1997, at 1F.
With the list of customers growing at the rate of about 30% per year, the demand
for thousands of new antennas is inevitable. See id. One source estimates that the
telecommunications industry will requirel40,000 sites for these towers by the year
2005. See CWA & THE EMR ALLIANCE, YOUR COMMUNITY GUIDE TO CELLULAR
PHONE TOWERS 15 (Dec. 1996) [hereinafter COMMUNITY GUIDE TO CELLULAR PHONE
TOWERS].

2. See Steve Adams, Companies Asked To Put Towers on Hold, THE PATRIOT
LEDGER, Oct. 8, 1997, at 17 (noting the neighbors often object to the height and
appearance of towers, and reporting a comment that one area was "becoming a
pincushion for these towers"); News, THE BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Oct. 16, 1997,

at 2B (reporting adoption of an ordinance requiring co-location of towers to avoid
the possibility of the area "looking like a pin cushion"); Counties Flex Power Over
Cellular Towers, BUSINESS-NORTH CAROLINA, June 1, 1997 (noting that "[nlo one

wants to end up a pin cushion stuck full of 200-foot pins").
3. Philip E. Harriman, Editorial, Cellular Towers Should Be Brought Under
State and Local Regulations,PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Sept. 25, 1997, at 11A ("As

we drive on the highways and byways of America today, we see communication
towers sprouting like mushrooms after the rain.").
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evidence that cell towers might pose significant health risks
to those who live in proximity to them. Such a possibility
suggests that we should proceed with caution when
constructing towers, particularly in residential neighborhoods.
However, despite the fact that towers are being
constructed in record numbers, regulation governing the
construction and placement of such towers is, at best,
haphazard. Federal law in particular is less than helpful. In
1996, Congress enacted an impressive piece of legislation
entitled the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the 1996
Act").5 Buried among its provisions is a restriction that
prevents state and local governments from regulating the
placement of cell towers on the basis of "environmental
effects."' While the proper interpretation of this prohibition
may be subject to debate, the prohibition is clearly not helpful
to people who are concerned with the issue of whether cell
towers should be constructed in residential neighborhoods.
In fact, regardless of how one ultimately views the 1996
Act, it is quite clear that it does not provide much affirmative
guidance as to where cell towers should be located.7 This
means that people interested in placement of cell towers
must turn to state and local rules for answers. Obviously, the
first and most logical source of such rules is zoning and
similar land use regulations. Unfortunately, the technological
developments in this area have out-paced the efforts of those
responsible for promulgating traditional land use regulations.
As a result, many communities do not have zoning
ordinances or other requirements in place to govern the
placement of cell towers.' Although numerous communities
have adopted temporary moratoria on cell tower construction

4. See infra notes 148-91 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
health concerns posed by cell towers).
5. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
at various sections of 47 U.S.C.).
6. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (Supp. 1998).
7. See infra Part I (discussing the 1996 Act more thoroughly).
8. The proliferation of towers has basically caught many communities
unprepared to deal with proposed construction projects. Stories in the press have
emphasized the fact that planning boards in many areas "have not anticipated this
new, exploding industry and therefore are not equipped to handle the challenges
they face between federal mandated rights the cellular industry secured and the
quality of life we expect local town councils and planning boards to preserve."
Harriman, supranote 3,at 11A.
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so that they can study this issue,9 there are still untold
thousands of towns and other areas where the placement of
cell towers is virtually unregulated.
Where does this leave the average citizen, living in an
unregulated jurisdiction, who learns that a cellular service
provider intends to locate a cell tower in his or her
neighborhood? One possibility, which may not be immediately obvious, is that existing restrictive covenants may
provide some basis for limiting the placement of cell towers in
residential areas. 0 Obviously, this technique will only work
in areas where restrictive covenants are already in place. In
addition, the applicability of these covenants may be
questionable, given that they were almost certainly drafted
before the proliferation of cell towers. Nevertheless, the
dearth of federal, state or local regulation leaves relatively
few options for concerned persons wishing to oppose the
construction of cell towers in their back yards. Therefore, it is
worth considering the potential impact of restrictive
covenants on cell tower construction.
The first part of this Article reviews the Telecommunications Act of 1996" as it applies to the construction of cell
towers. In particular, it focuses on the extent to which the
1996 Act preempts or otherwise limits state and local
governments' authority to regulate the placement of such
towers. The second part of this Article explains how various
restrictive covenants might be used to oppose the placement
9. See infra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
10. The fact that planning board and zoning requirements may be insufficient
to protect the quality of life is precisely the reason that restrictive covenants are so
common. One source describes the situations as follows:
[S]ubdivision developers who seek to make the area more desirable for
potential buyers have frequently incorporated a wide variety of
restrictions in the deeds of the individual lots, usually seeking to
maintain a pleasant residential atmosphere. For example, some very
common restrictions limit the use of the property to residences, provide
for a setback so that all structures built within the subdivision are set
back from the street and separated from adjoining structures by a
specified distance, or disallow multiple dwellings, trailers, signs, or
offensive uses. These covenant restrictions are ordinarily placed in all
the subdivision deeds, and thus they are enforceable through an
injunctive action by any one of the buyers against violations or
threatened violations by any one of the other buyers.
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Waiver of Right To Enforce Restrictive Covenant by
Failure to Object to Other Violations, 25 A-L.R.5th 123, 144 (1995) (citation
omitted).
11. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at various sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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of towers. The third part reviews briefly the question of who
will have standing to enforce restrictive covenants that might
be applicable. The final part raises an issue which may be
important in some instances-the question of whether
restrictive covenants can be invoked to preclude the
construction of towers on land if other similar towers are
already located in the area.
I.

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 AND LIMITS ON
STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY To REGULATE THE
PLACEMENT OF TOWERS

A. How Does the Act Relate to Cellular Towers?
The 1996 Act must factor into any discussion of how to
oppose construction of cell towers." This Act represents the
first major revision to federal telecommunications law since
1934, and it contains provisions which address such diverse
issues as interstate telephone services, cable rates, obscene or
harassing use of telecommunications facilities and parental
choice." Most of the commentary on the 1996 Act focuses on
these provisions, 14 but the truth is that the 1996 Act also
includes some very important limitations on the right of state
and local governments, and instrumentalities thereof, to
regulate the placement of wireless service facilities, such as
cell towers. 5 Although the portion of the 1996 Act which
regulates the provision of wireless services and facilities,
such as cell towers, expressly states that local zoning
12. See id.
13. Phillip Rosario & Mark F. Kohler, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: A
State Perspective, 29 CONN. L. REv. 331 (1997) (describing in detail the various
aspects of the Act).
14. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996,
29 CONN. L. REV. 123 (1996). The fact that these provisions have received the bulk
of attention has been remarked upon by other commentators.
One provision of the 1996 Act has received very little attention. Section
704 of the Act limits the authority of state and local governments to
regulate the siting of wireless telecommunications towers and other
facilities. This oversight is quite understandable given the enormity of
the many other issues that the Act attempts to tackle.
Rosario & Kohler, supranote 13, at 347 (citation omitted).
15. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(C)(ii) (Supp. 1998) (defining the term "personal
wireless service facilities" to mean 'Tacilities for the provision of personal wireless
services").
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authority is to be preserved "[e]xcept as provided" in the
statute," the 1996 Act clearly preempts certain types of state
action. In particular, state and local authorities are precluded
from regulating "the placement, construction, and
modification of personal wireless service facilities" in any
manner which: (1) discriminates among service providers; (2)
prohibits the provision of personal wireless services; (3)
unreasonably delays approval -of such developments; or (4)
regulates the "placement, construction, and modification of
personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the
environmental effects of radio frequency emissions." 7
Essentially, the 1996 Act preempts state and local
authority to do three things: discriminate among service
providers, deny or unreasonably delay the provision of
wireless services and regulate "the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the
basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency
emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the
[Federal
Communication]
Commission's
regulations
concerning such emissions." 8 The effect of these rules is to
limit state and local authority to regulate the placement of
wireless service facilities-including cell towers.
16. "Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall
limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality
thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification
of personal wireless service facilities." 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(A) (Supp. 1998).
17. In pertinent part, 47 U.S.C.A § 332(c)(7)(B) (Supp. 1998) reads as follows:
(i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of
personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government or
instrumentality thereof(I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally
equivalent services; and
(II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of
personal wireless services.
(ii) A State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall act on
any request for authorization to place, construct, or modify personal
wireless service facilities within a reasonable period of time after the
request is duly filed with such government or instrumentality, taking
into account the nature and scope of such request.
(iv) No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may
regulate the placement, construction, and modification of personal
wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of
radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with
the Commission's regulations concerning such emissions.
Id.
18. Id.
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However, the 1996 Act does not preempt all state and
local authority to regulate such placement. Indeed, the
Conference Report explains that Congress intended that
state and local authorities would retain the right to "treat
facilities that create different visual, aesthetic, or safety
concerns differently to the extent permitted under generally
applicable zoning requirements .... ."' In the words of certain
commentators, "while state or local authorities may not
altogether preclude the siting of a telecommunications tower,
they may still restrict the siting of such towers from places
that would result in significant adverse environmental or
aesthetic impacts." °
In light of the foregoing, it remains unclear what state
and local governments may and may not do in this area.
Obviously, they cannot adopt rules that would discriminate
among providers, and they cannot adopt rules that would
preclude the provision of wireless services. The only other
limitation on state and local governments is that they may
not regulate radio frequency (also referred to as "RF")
emissions in ways that are inconsistent with the national
standards adopted by the FCC. The FCC has confirmed the
limited nature of the 1996 Act's express prohibitions by
recognizing that the 1996 Act was intended to establish a
"framework for the exercise of jurisdiction by state and local
zoning authorities over the construction, modification and
placement of facilities for personal wireless facilities."2 '
The foregoing discussion, however, focuses primarily on
the authority retained by state and local governments. The
question of whether the 1996 Act expressly or impliedly
preempts the power of private citizens to enforce restrictive
covenants on their land is slightly different. It does not seem
likely that private restrictive covenants would either
discriminate among service providers or have the effect of
denying adequate sites to wireless service providers. As a
19. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
124,222.
20. Rosario & Kohler, supra note 13, at 350; see also John M. Phelen et al.,
Symposium, PanelIII: Implications of the New TelecommunicationsLegislation, 6
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 517, 540-41 (1996) ('The 1996 Act
affirms that local governments have the authority to determine, in a reasonable
non-discriminatory manner, the placement of mobile services and wireless
common carrier sites.").
21. WIRELESs TELECOMMICATIONS BUREAu, FCC, FACT SHEET # 2, at I

[hereinafter FCC FACT SHEET # 2] (on file with author and the Buffalo Law
Review).
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result, the only possible grounds for challenging the
enforcement of restrictive covenants would be to argue that
such enforcement amounts to a prohibited regulation of "the
placement, construction, and modification of personal
wireless service facilities on the basis
22 of the environmental
effects of radio frequency emissions."
Although it is highly unlikely that the terms of any
restrictive covenant will speak directly to RF emission
standards for cell towers, it is possible that restrictive
covenants might have an indirect impact based partly on
such emissions. For example, if a restrictive covenant
prohibited offensive or noxious activities, a neighboring
landowner might argue that the RF emissions of a cell tower
violate the restriction.23 It might also be argued that such an
application of a restrictive covenant would represent an
impermissible, indirect regulation of cell towers based on the
environmental effects of the tower's radio emissions.
Most of the arguments about whether restrictive
covenants should apply to cell towers will likely have nothing
to do with RF emissions or their environmental effects. Yet it
is possible that these kinds of arguments could be made in a
lawsuit wherein the plaintiffs, relying on a restrictive
covenant, opposed the construction of cell towers. It is
therefore worth considering whether the 1996 Act preempts
states from enforcing private restrictive covenants where the
plaintiffs to the action are, in whole or in part, trying to
enforce a restrictive covenant on the basis of the RF
emissions from cell towers.
B. Does the 1996 Act Preempt State Enforcement of
Restrictive Covenants that Would Affect the Placement of
Cellular Towers Based in Whole or in Parton Radio
Frequency Emissions?
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that "the Laws of the United States... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."24
Congress clearly possesses the power to preempt state law
22. 47 U.S.CA § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (Supp. 1998).
23. For one way in which such an argument might be made see Part II.B. of
this Article.
24. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.

712

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

pursuant to this provision.

There are essentially three situations in which federal
preemption of state law can occur: (1) express preemption,
where Congress expressly preempts state law; (2) field
preemption, where Congress occupies the entire field; and (3)
conflict preemption, where there is an actual conflict between
federal and state law. The latter two forms of preemption
(field and conflict preemption) are both implied rather than
explicit forms of preemption.25 In an appropriate case, state
tort claims can fall within the preemptive reach of a federal
statute.
In any case where preemption is a possibility, the critical
inquiry is whether Congress intended federal law to
supersede state law. The general presumption is that
preemption "will not lie unless it is the 'clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."28 In addition, in considering whether a
particular matter has indeed been preempted, one must start
with the assumption that subjects which have traditionally
been subject to state regulation will not be preempted by
federal law unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.29
In this case, the 1996 Act itself recognizes congressional
policy to preserve state and local authority over placement of
wireless facilities." In addition, the legislative history of the
25. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98
(1992).
26. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 661-62, 664 (1993)
(finding that "[legal duties imposed on railroads by the common law fall within
the scope of"45 U.S.C. § 434, preempting any state "law, rule, regulation, order, or
standard relating to railroad safety"); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 520-23 (1992) (holding that the preemptive reach of the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 5(b), Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994)), is not limited to positive enactments by
legislatures and agencies but may also include certain state law damage actions).
27. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
28. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218 (1947)).
29. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230); see also
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("because the States are
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that
Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action"); Easterwood,
507 U.S. at 663-64 ("In the interest of avoiding unintended encroachment on the
authority of the States, however, a court interpreting a federal statute pertaining
to a subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find
pre-emption."); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81
(1987).
30. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(A) (Supp. 1998).
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1996 Act confirms that Congress did not intend to usurp state
and local authority, save for certain narrow provisions set
forth in the statute. 1 Similarly, the larger piece of legislation
into which the 1996 Act was incorporated, the Communications Act of 1934," also preserves common law rights and
remedies.33
The extent of the 1996 Act's potential preemptive effect,
then, should be evaluated in light of the fact that zoning and
land use regulation have traditionally been matters left to
state and local law.34 Certainly, states have traditionally
regulated land use, and siting authority for projects such as
the construction of cell towers has typically been left to states
or local governments.35 Thus, there is every reason to believe
that the 1996 Act's preemption of state law is limited, and
does not extend to judicial enforcement of privately imposed
restrictive covenants.
With regard to the possibility of express preemption,
there are essentially three reasons why the 1996 Act should
not be interpreted to prevent enforcement of private deed
restrictions. First, authority suggests that preemption should
always be narrowly construed. There is nothing in the
context of the 1996 Act which suggests that this general
presumption should not apply, and, indeed, because enforceability of private deed restrictions has traditionally been a
matter of state law, 6 there is additional force to the
argument that this is not a case where preemption should be
broadly construed.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, there is the
31. See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
124, 222 ('CThe conference agreement creates a new section 704 which ... preserves

the authority of State and local governments over zoning and land use matters
except in the limited circumstances set forth in the conference agreement.").
32. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 154614 (1994) (containing chapter 5 of title 47, subtitled "Wire or Radio Communication").
33. The Communications Act of 1934 specifies that "[n]othing in this chapter
contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such
remedies." 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1994). The 1996 Act did not change or limit this
language. See 47 U.S.CA § 414 (Supp. 1998).
34. See ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITLEMAN, LAND USE, CASES AND
MATERALus 955-57 (5th ed. 1997) ("Normally, we do not think of the federal
government setting out to override local land use regulations"); see also id. at 956
n.3 (discussing the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
35. See id. at 955-57.
36. See id.
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language of the statute itself. The section of the 1996 Act that
contains the limited preemption of state regulatory authority
is entitled "Preservation of Local Zoning Authority."37 This
supports the idea that the general effect of the following
language is to regulate zoning authority over cell towers and
not other limitations on the placement of such facilities.
This conclusion is also bolstered by the inclusion of the
1996 Act within the Communications Act of 1934. Because
the Communications Act itself contains language which
preserves the "remedies now existing at common law" and
further provides that the federal statutory remedies are "in
addition to such remedies, " 8 it seems obvious that the federal
preemption of state authority to regulate cell tower
placement should be narrowly construed.
Prior case law confirms that this reservation of rights
generally means that private causes of action under state law
should not be considered to be impaired by the Federal
Communications Act, into which the 1996 Act has been
incorporated. For example, in Ashley v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co.,39 the court stated that pursuant to section 414
of the Communications Act:
[F]ederal remedies, therefore, are cumulative to those already
existing at common law or by statute. While the national
government may have preempted the field in regulation of
telephone and wire communication systems under the
Communications Act, the Act was not designed as a new code for
the adjustment of private rights. 40

Obviously, Ashley was decided before the enactment of
the 1996 Act, and does not specifically refer to the new
provisions that have been codified as part of that legislation.4'
The reasoning of the court, however, continues to be valid.
The 1996 Act was enacted and incorporated as part of the
overall Communications Act. It does not include an express
preemption of private rights of action under state law. It is
not designed as a "new code for the adjustment of private
37. 47 U.S.CA § 332(c)(7) (Supp. 1998).
38. 47 U.S.CA. § 414 (Supp. 1998). This provision actually states that "nothing
in this chapter" shall abridge such rights, and the provisions of the 1996 Act which
might arguably preempt state law relating to cell towers are certainly codified in
this chapter. Id.
39. 410 F. Supp. 1389, 1393 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
40. Id.

41. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (Supp. 1998).
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rights." It did not amend, repeal or supersede section 414 of
the Communications Act. Instead, the new provisions are
very narrowly tailored to focus on the rights of state and local
governments to exercise their zoning authority, and that is
how the statue should be interpreted-in accordance with its
plain language.
Finally, express preemption is made highly unlikely by
the fact that Congress did not elect to state within the 1996
Act that the preemptive effect of the Act would reach private
restrictive covenants, or state law actions designed to enforce
such actions. In fact, there is ample authority to support the
argument that Congress knows how to extend preemption to
private causes of action or state court actions when it wishes
to do so." Thus, failure to include language evidencing this
intent is itself evidence that preemption should not be
interpreted so broadly. Given the failure of the 1996 Act to
include language relating to such private restrictions and
causes of action, and the complete absence of any legislative
history suggesting that Congress intended the 1996 Act to
reach so broadly, the obvious conclusion is that the 1996 Act
does not expressly preempt enforcement of restrictive
covenants, even if the restrictive covenants might in some
sense result in regulation based in part on RF emissions.
The next potential argument is that through field
preemption, the 1996 Act impliedly preempts state
enforcement of restrictive covenants. The issue of implied
preemption is one which has recently been addressed by the
Supreme Court, albeit in connection with a federal statute
which is far different from the Telecommunications Act of
1996.
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.," the Court considered
the viability of state law claims made by and on behalf of
42. If Congress had intended in that clause to preclude state tort claims, it
could have easily achieved this result. See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
487 (1996) ("[I]f Congress intended to preclude all common-law causes of action, it
chose a singularly odd word ['requirement'] with which to do it. The statute [21
U.S.C. § 360k(a)] would have achieved an identical result, for instance, if it had
precluded any 'remedy' under state law relating to medical devices."); see also
Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 824 (11th Cir. 1989) ("An additional
factor militating against a finding that the language of the Safety Act expressly
preempts appellants' claims is that Congress did not make explicit reference to
state common law in the Aces preemption clause as it has in the preemption
clauses of many other statutes. Congress has long demonstrated an aptitude for
expressly barring common law actions when it so desires.").
43. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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former smoker and lung cancer victim Rose Cipollone against
various cigarette manufacturers. The manufacturers in
Cipollone had asserted that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertisement Act and its successor, the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act,44 protected them from liability based
on their conduct after enactment of this legislation. The
Court in Cipollone determined that the preemptive scope of
these acts was to be governed entirely by the preemption
clauses contained in the legislation. In reaching this
conclusion, the court stated as follows:
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has
included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly
addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a "reliable

indicium

of

congressional

intent

with

respect

to

state

authority"... "there is no need to infer congressional intent to
pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions" of the
legislation. Such reasoning is a variant of the familiar principle of
expression unius est exclusio alterius: Congress' enactment of a
provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a 45
statute implies that
matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.

In a later decision, however, the United States Supreme
Court clarified Cipollone, and explained that the fact that
there is limited express preemption does not completely
preclude the possibility of implied preemption; rather, the
Court explained, "Cipollone supports an inference that an
express pre-emption clause forecloses implied preemption ....
'
In connection with the 1996 Act, there simply is no
reason for courts to imply preemption beyond the confines of
the statute. Cipollone stands for the rule that there is a
presumption against expanding the scope of the express
preemption, and that there is no justification for taking an
extremely narrow express preemption and expanding it to
occupy the field.
First and foremost, then, it is worth noting that the
extent of the 1996 Act's express preemption is extremely
curtailed. The 1996 Act specifically provides: "Except as
provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall
limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (codifying provisions of the Act).
45. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
46. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1995).
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instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the
placement construction, and modification of wireless service
facilities."A Moreover, legislative history is quite consistent
with the finding that Congress intended a very narrow
preemption of state law.48 Under these circumstances, there
is little room to argue that Congress has impliedly preempted
the field.
Finally, there does not seem to be a valid argument in
favor of implied conflict preemption. Implied conflict
preemption can occur in essentially two instances: (1) where
it is impossible to comply with both state and federal
requirements or (2) where state law obstructs Congressional
objectives.49 In the case of the 1996 Act and its impact on the
regulation of cell towers, it should be obvious that it would
not be impossible to comply with federal requirements and
privately imposed restrictive covenants as well. State
enforcement of private deed restrictions might mean that
wireless service providers would not be able to place towers
in every neighborhood; it might also mean that they'might
have to adopt service plans that are not always optimally
efficient. However, the 1996 Act does not guarantee wireless
service providers the right to place towers wherever they
wish. Instead, the 1996 Act merely prevents state and local
governments from exercising their zoning powers to
discriminate among providers in a manner which would
result in the denial of wireless services, or to regulate
placement of facilities based on environmental effects of RF
emissions. Preservation of this statutory scheme is not
inconsistent with enforcing private restrictive covenants,
even if such an enforcement would require a court to consider
the effects of RF emissions.
As of the date of this writing, only one reported appellate
decision directly addresses the issue of whether the 1996 Act
preempts private causes of action not involving zoning or
land use regulation. In Kapton v. Bell Atlantic Nynex
Mobile, " the court heard an appeal from a trial court's ruling
that a property owner's nuisance claim, based on the health
risks posed by RF transmissions, was preempted by the 1996
Act.5 ' Unfortunately, the plaintiff abandoned her claims
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(A) (Supp. 1998).
See supranote 31 and accompanying text.
See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 287.
700 A.2d 581 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
Id.
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before the appeal, and a majority of the court concluded "we
need not determine the preemption issue" because the
appellant had voluntarily abandoned any claims arising out
of the health effects of the electromagnetic radiation.52
However, Judge Kelley, writing in dissent, did reach the
issue of preemption and concluded that the 1996 Act would
not preempt a private cause of action sounding in nuisance. 3
Thus, to achieve the stated purposes of the Act, the Federal
Congress has specifically limited the ability of a state or local
government to regulate the placement or construction of personal
wireless service facilities, and has afforded providers of such
services with a form of redress should a state or local government
violate the provisions of the Act.... However, Congress has also
specifically stated that the provisions of the Act do not "[i]n any
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or
by statute.. . ." Clearly, the provisions of section 332 of the Act do
not eliminate or affect the ability of Appellant to maintain
an
54
action sounding in nuisance under the law of Pennsylvania.

The authority that exists to date therefore suggests that
private citizens should be able to oppose the construction of
cell towers by relying on existing restrictive covenants, or
indeed by making other objections under state law. While the
1996 Act clearly preempts some types of state action,
including the adoption of zoning regulations based on the
environmental effect of RF emissions, the preemptive scope of
the 1996 Act should not extend to judicial enforcement of
restrictive covenants.
C. Preemption of Related State Law Claims:FCCAuthority
over Satellite Receivers and Claims Involving Radio
FrequencyInterference
Although Kapton is the only reported case to date which
deals directly with the issue of the 1996 Act's preemptive
effect on private causes of action that may turn on the health
effects of RF emissions from cell towers, there are other
analogous instances in which the FCC's authority to regulate
has given rise to claims of federal preemption of state law
claims. In order to understand the 1996 Act's preemptive
52. Id. at 583-84.
53. Id. at 583-87 (Kelley, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 587 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
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scope, an examination of some of those cases is in order. One
analogous series of cases deals with federal preemption of
state and local zoning laws and regulations that govern the
placement of satellite receivers and similar antennas. 55
In the early 1980s, the FCC determined that local
regulation of satellite facilities might interfere with various
rights recognized by Congress in the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984."6 Therefore, the FCC promulgated a
regulation that expressly preempted certain local ordinances.
In pertinent part, this FCC regulation provides:
(a) Any state or local zoning, land-use, building, or similar
regulation that materially limits transmission or reception by
satellite earth station antennas, or imposes more than minimal
costs on users of such antennas, is preempted unless the
promulgating authority can demonstrate that such regulation is
reasonable, except that non-federal regulation of radio frequency
emissions is not preempted by this section. For purposes of this
paragraph (a), reasonable means that the local regulation: (1) Has
a clearly defined health, safety or aesthetic objective that is stated
in the text of the regulation itself; and (2) Furthers the stated
health, safety or aesthetic objective without unnecessarily
burdening the federal interests in ensuring access to satellite
services and in promoting fair and effective5 7 competition among
competing communications service providers.

This FCC regulation is particularly relevant to the issue of
determining whether the 1996 Act preempts the enforcement
of private restrictive covenants against the construction of
cell towers because of the way in which its limitation
language resembles the limitations on "state and local
zoning" found in the 1996 Act. In fact, an analysis of the
cases decided pursuant to this FCC regulation indicates that
preemption of such zoning authority should not ordinarily
extend to privately imposed restrictive covenants.
The cases are in agreement that the above-cited FCC
regulation does in fact preempt certain state and local zoning
authority.58 Of course, an ordinance which complies with the
55. See 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 (1997).
56. 47 U.S.C. § 605(b) (1994). The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
left intact preexisting prohibitions against the unauthorized use of radio or wire
communications, but added an exemption for the interception or receipt of satellite
cable programming for private viewing. See id.
57. 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 (1997).
58. See, e.g., Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 552 (6th Cir. 1994)
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affirmative requirements of the regulation will be upheld,"
but any ordinance in violation of the FCC regulation will be
preempted and state courts will be without jurisdictional
authority to enforce any ordinance adopted in contravention
of the FCC's requirements. Several cases interpreting the
FCC regulation are of interest because they address the issue
of whether this preemption extends to judicial enforcement of
private restrictive covenants-an enforcement that would
affect the placement of satellite dishes and similar facilities."
The courts in all of these cases have held that the FCC
regulation's preemptive effect does not extend so far as to
preempt privately arranged land use restrictions.
Brentmoor Place Residents Association v. Warren61 is a
case illustrative of this line of decisions. In Brentmoor Place,
the homeowners' association filed an action for injunctive
relief against one of the neighborhood's homeowners, Mr.
Warren, alleging that he had installed a satellite dish
antenna in violation of restrictive covenants.62 In response,
the Warrens alleged, among other things, that the FCC had
preempted these kinds of attempts to regulate the placement
of satellite receivers.63 They cited in support of this argument
the FCC regulation that by its terms preempts "State and
local government zoning."' In rejecting the contention that
enforcement of such privately arranged restrictions had been
preempted, the court stated:
The restrictive covenant.., gave the [Homeowners' Association]
Board authority to deny the Warrens' request to install the
(involving a zoning ordinance forbidding antennas exceeding certain size
limitations); Town of Deerfield v. FCC, 992 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1993) (preempting
town ordinance prohibiting satellite dish or tower-type antennas from being
erected on any lot under one-half acre; immediate issue dealt with FCC's refusal to
issue an order prior to final judicial determination of issue); Neufeld v. City of
Baltimore, 820 F. Supp. 963, 968-69 (D. Md. 1993), affd on reconsideration,863 F.
Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1994) (involving zoning ordinance regulating size of satellite
dishes).
59. See, e.g., Abbott v. City of Cape Canaveral, 840 F. Supp. 880, 884-85 (M.D.
Fla. 1994) (upholding municipal ordinance regulating placement of satellite
dishes).
60. See Brentmoor Place Residents Ass'n v. Warren, 816 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Mo.
App. 1991); Breeling v. Churchill, 423 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Neb. 1988); Ross v.
Hatfield, 640 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D. Kan. 1986).
61. 816 S.W.2d 7 (D. Kan. 1986).
62. Id. at9.
63. See id. at 11.
64. Id.
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satellite dish antenna. That restrictive covenant cannot be deemed
"state and local government zoning," or other state and local
government regulation; rather it is a private contractual
obligation.65

Similarly, in Ross v. Hatfield,6 6 the plaintiff homeowner
wanted to place a satellite receiver on his land in violation of
restrictive covenants. The court stated, "[p]laintiffs'
complaint alleges that defendants' threatened judicial
enforcement of the covenant would impede the federal
scheme of preemption under the Communications Act of
1934... ,67 Reciting the rule that "federal law preempts
state law where the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of Congress," 8
the court refused to extend the preemptive reach of the FCC
regulation of state and local zoning to private restrictive
covenants.
A new federal regulation adopted by the Federal Communications
Commission implementing the Communications Act provides that
only "state and local zoning or other regulations" . . . are
preempted . .
. It is clear then that in order to bring their
reemption claims, plaintiffs must allege a state or local law or
ordinance, or at a minimum some equivalent state action ....
[P]laintiffs have alleged only the existence of a private covenant..
. . There being no state action or state law to be preempted in this
case, we hold that this court lacks
69 subject matter jurisdiction to
hear plaintiffs' preemption claims.

These cases support the conclusion that the preemptive
reach of the 1996 Act should not extend so far as to preclude
judicial enforcement of privately negotiated restrictive
covenants. The type of state action involved in the
enforcement of such privately arranged restrictions is simply
not equivalent to the adoption of zoning ordinances and
similar land use regulations.
There is also case law involving claims of federal
preemption where the underlying issue deals with allegations
of radio frequency interference (or "RFI"). ° In In re Graeme,71
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. (citation omitted).
640 F. Supp. 708 (D. Kan. 1986).
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id.
See In re Graeme, 975 F. Supp. 570 (D.Vt. 1997); Broyde v. Gotham Tower,
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a case which was decided after enactment of the 1996 Act,
the court offered a fairly detailed discussion of this issue. In
Graeme, the city zoning administrator issued a notice of
violation to a radio station operator, alleging that the
operation of the broadcast facility caused interference with
electronic devices in violation of the terms and conditions of
the radio station's zoning permit."2 At the hearing on the
notice, the zoning authority found that the radio station had
caused "continuous and widespread" radio frequency
interference."3 However, the authority also found that it had
no jurisdiction to enforce the zoning condition because the
FCC had exclusive jurisdiction over claims of radio frequency
interference." The neighbors appealed that determination,
and the radio station responded with the contention that "the
Federal 75Communications Act preempts the Neighbors' zoning
appeal."

After observing that "Congressional Intent is the
'ultimate touchstone' of preemption analysis,""6 the district
court noted that the "Federal Communications Act of 1934
(as amended) does not contain an express provision
preempting state or local regulation of radio frequency
interference."" However, the court also found that the Act
was a "unified and comprehensive regulatory system"
pursuant to which the FCC had been given "statutory
authority to regulate the transmission of radio energy that
creates interference." The court also noted that Congress
had specifically authorized the FCC to establish "minimum
performance standards for home electronic equipment and
Inc., 13 F.3d 994 (6th Cir. 1994); Still v. Michaels, 791 F. Supp. 248 (D. Ariz. 1992);
Winfield Village Coop. v. Ruiz, 537 N.E.2d 331 (l. App. Ct. 1989); Blackburn v.
Doubleday Broad. Co., Inc., 353 N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 1984). The FCC has also
addressed the issue of preemption in the context of radio-frequency interference
claims. See, e.g., In re 960 Radio, Inc., FCC 85-578, 1985 WL 193883 (holding that
zoning board was preempted from requiring FM station to avoid radio frequency
interference with existing facilities).
71. 975 F. Supp. 570.
72. Id. at 571.
73. Id. at 572.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
77. Id. at 573.
78. Id. (relying on National Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 214 (1943),
for a description of the Communications Act of 1934); see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 301,
302a(a)(1), 303(c)-(f) (1994) (concerning the statutory grant of authority to the

FCC).
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79
systems to reduce their susceptibility to interference."
Finally, the court considered the fact that in connection with
the Communications Amendment Act of 1982, Congress
clarified the extent of the FCC's authority over radio
frequency interference issues (or "RFI issues"): "The House
Conference Report which accompanied the Communications
Amendments Act of 1982 clarified that 'exclusive jurisdiction
over RFI incidents (including preemption of state and local
regulation of such phenomena) lies with the FCC.' "' This
same report also included the following statement:

Such matters [those involving radio frequency interference] shall
not be regulated by local or state law, nor shall radio transmitting
apparatus be subject to local or state regulation as part of any
effort to resolve an RFI complaint. The Conferees believe that
radio transmitter operators should not be subject to fines,
forfeitures or other liability imposed by any local or state authority
as a result of interference appearing in home electronic equipment
or systems. Rather, the Conferees intend that regulation of RFI
phenomena shall be imposed only by the Commission.8 '

The court then briefly cited to existing case law dealing
with issue of preemption of RFI claims. 82 Each of the cited
cases had held that such claims were preempted.
Finally, based upon the court's examination of the
Federal Communications Act itself, the explicit legislative
history and the existing case law, the court held that "the

FCC has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints involving
radio frequency interference, whether they are cast as
79. In re Graeme, 975 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D. Vt. 1997) (citing 47 U.S.C. §
302a(a)(1)).
80. Id. at 573-74 (quoting H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 97-765, at 16 (1982), reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.CA.N. 2261).
81. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 97-765, at 33, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.AkN. 2261,
2277; see also Graeme, 975 F. Supp. at 574 (quoting from and discussing this
House Conference Report).
82. See Graeme, 975 F. Supp. at 575. The court in Graeme cited the following
cases, each of which involved nuisance claims based on RFI: Broyde v. Gotham
Tower, Inc., 13 F.3d 994 (6th Cir. 1994); Still v. Michaels, 791 F. Supp. 248 (D.
Ariz. 1992) (dismissing RFI nuisance suit); Blackburn v. Doubleday Broad. Co.,
Inc., 353 N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 1984). See Graeme, 975 F. Supp. at 575. The court
also cited two administrative determinations by the FCC: In re Mobilecomm of
New York, Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 5519 (1987) (involving local zoning ordinance regulating
RFI in radio paging facility conflicts with federal scheme); In re 960 Radio, Inc.,
FCC 85-578, 1985 WL 193883 (involving local zoning board preempted from
requiring FM station to avoid RFI with existing facilities). See Graeme, 975 F.
Supp. at 575.
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nuisance actions or zoning violations ... "83
The cases cited in Graeme, including various
administrative determinations by the FCC itself, all relied
upon findings of Congressional intent sufficient to support
preemption of state law claims of radio frequency intererence. They also involved only nuisance claims or claims
arising out of zoning requirements.
The earliest of the cited cases is Blackburn v. Doubleday
Broadcasting Company, Inc.,' which involved a nuisance
action based on claimed radio frequency interference. The
opinion in this case quotes extensively from the Conference
Report to the Communications Amendments Act of 1982 in
finding that Congress intended to preempt this type of state
action." Blackburn also relied on the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in
Optometry,8 as supportive of the FCC's "exclusive"
jurisdiction "over 'technical matters' such as frequency
allocation.""7
In turn, the FCC relied on Blackburn in its administrative determination in In re 960 Radio, Inc.88 In this
decision, the FCC struck down certain zoning requirements
which would have regulated radio frequency interference. In
finding that state authority to promulgate this type of
regulation had been preempted, the FCC stated:
[A]ssuming there was any doubt regarding our jurisdiction to
regulate interference, Congress certainly removed such doubts
when, in amending the Communications Act in 1982, it stated:
The Conference Substitute is further intended to clarify the
reservation of exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Communications Commission over matters involving RFI (radio frequency
interference).89

83. Graeme, 975 F. Supp. at 575.
84. 353 N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 1984).
85. See id. at 555-56 (citing to H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-765, at 33 (1982),
reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C-.N. 2261,2277).
86. 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
87. Id. at 430 n.6, cited in Blackburn v. Doubleday Broad. Co., 353 N.W.2d 550,
555 (Minn. 1984). The broad concept of "frequency allocation" clearly encompasses
issues concerning the transmission of radio signals.
88. FCC 85-578, 1985 WL 193883 (also available on 1985 FCC LEXIS 2342
(Oct. 29, 1985)).
89. 960 Radio, 1985 WL 193883, at *5 (citing the H.R. CONF. REPORT No. 97765, at 33 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 2261, 2277).
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The court in Still v. Michaels" relied primarily on the
FCC decision in 960 Radio when it held that state law
nuisance actions based on claims of radio frequency
interference were preempted, and the court in Broyde v.
Gotham Tower, Inc.9t relied on the "explicit congressional
pronouncements" found in the House Report in reaching the
same conclusion. 92
None of these cases, however, actually address the issue
of whether private agreements or contracts, such as those
imposed by restrictive covenants, are also preempted by state
law. In fact, the one opinion that does deal with this issue
reached the conclusion that federal preemption of RFI
matters does not extend so far. In Winfield Village
Cooperative v. Ruiz,9 a landlord sought to enforce the
provisions of an occupancy agreement against a resident who
allegedly had violated that agreement by operating a short
wave radio transmitter and thereby interfering with
consumer electronic equipment of other occupants in the
building.94 The court recognized the extensive authority of the
FCC to regulate matters involving claims of RFI, but the
court also found that the FCC's exclusive authority did not
extend to private disputes between FCC licensees. 95 In
reaching this conclusion, the court cited to Radio Station
WOW, Inc. v. Johnson,96 wherein the Supreme Court found
that the Communications Act of 1934 "did not deprive" state
courts of*urisdiction over fraudulent actions by licensed radio
stations. The Winfield Village court also cited to Regents of
98 wherein the
the University System of Georgia v. Carroll,
Supreme Court stated that the Telecommunications Act
"does not specifically empower the [FCC] to adjudicate the
contractual liability of a licensee for its contracts or to declare
a licensee's contracts unenforceable in the courts . ... "99
Based upon this authority, the Winfield Village court
concluded that the dispute before it was essentially "a breach
90. 791 F. Supp. 248 (D. Ariz. 1992).
91. 13 F.3d 994 (6th Cir. 1994).
92. Id. at 998.
93. 537 N.E.2d 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
94. See id. at 332.
95. See id. at 332-33.
96. 326 U.S. 120 (1945).
97. Winfield Village, 537 N.E.2d at 333; see also Radio Station WOW, 326 U.S.
at 131 (containing the authority relied on by the Winfield Village court).
98. 338 U.S. 586 (1950).
99. Id. at 600.
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of contract action between plaintiff landlord and tenant
defendants based on a claim of radio frequency
interference."' ° The court ruled that "the defendants
voluntarily signed the occupancy agreement" and were
therefore "charged with full knowledge of the restrictions on
the use of the dwelling unit."' Although the lawsuit
"incidentally implicated" radio frequency interference claims,
the court found that the plaintiffs' case involved "only state
laws of contracts and landlord tenant relations" and that, as
a result, the trial 0court
"should have retained jurisdiction
2
over its resolution.",
There are therefore two distinct reasons why the FCC's
authority over radio frequency emissions should not preempt
private actions seeking to enforce the terms of restrictive
covenants-even if these enforcement actions could obstruct
cell tower construction on the basis of the proposed towers'
radio frequency emissions. First, as Winfield Village
indicates, restrictive covenants should not be equated with
the type of zoning decisions which the 1996 Act undoubtedly
preempts. Second, substantial evidence of congressional
intent is required in order to infer federal preemption of
private state causes of action, and there is no such evidence
in the case of the 1996 Act.
With respect to the first of these reasons for limiting the
preemptive scope of the 1996 Act, restrictive covenants are
clearly in the nature of private agreements inasmuch as they
typically involve purchasers of land interests agreeing, as a
condition of their purchase, to be bound by certain terms.
Even if the judicial enforcement of such covenants
"incidentally implicates" radio frequency emissions, the
nature of such claims should not be within the FCC's
exclusive jurisdiction.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 has been described
as "expansive legislation designed primarily to increase
competition in the telecommunications industry."' ° It was
passed "in order to provide a 'pro-competitive, deregulatory
national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly
private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications
100. 537 N.E.2d at 333.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. BelSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 944 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D.
Ga. 1996).

1998]

"NOTIN MY BACK YARD!"

727

and information technologies and services . . '""' Specifically, the 1996 Act represented a Congressional attempt
"to stop local authorities from keeping wireless providers tied
up in the hearing process."1 5 In other words, the clear focus of
the 1996 Act was to prevent large-scale state actions that
would have an anti-competitive effect on the industry or that
would unduly delay the deployment of facilities such as cell
towers.
Significantly, the 1996 Act was not an attempt to
completely preempt state law that related to the placement of
0 ° observed, one of
cell towers. In fact, as the court in Graeme'
the purposes of the '1996 Act was to "prevent FCC
preemption" of certain local and state land use decisions.17
Given this context, it seems clear that the rationale of
Winfield Village ought to apply to the question of whether the
1996 Act preempts enforcement of restrictive covenants that
might have an impact on the placement of cell towers. The
fact that such claims might implicate the effects of radio
frequency emissions is incidental to the privately imposed
terms of the restrictive covenant. The judicial enforcement of
such private contractual arrangements governing the use of
particular plots of land does not inherently conflict with
federal policy as embodied in the 1996 Act.
Even more importantly, with regard to the second reason
for limiting the preemptive scope of the 1996 Act, there is a
critical distinction between the preemption of claims
involving radio frequency interference and claims involving
the effect of radio frequency emissions. Congress has
specifically spoken about its intent to preempt interference
claims, albeit in the Conference Report rather than in the
legislation itself.0 8 There is no similar indication of legislative
intent with respect to the preemption of state law claims
involving the effects of radio frequency emissions. The FCC
has held that state law zoning and nuisance claims based on
radio frequency interference are subject to preemption. 0 9 The
104. Paging, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 957 F. Supp 805, 807 (W.D. Va.
1997) (citation omitted).
105. Westel-Milwaukee Co. v. Walworth County Park, 566 N.W.2d 107, 109
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
106. 975 F. Supp. 570 (D. Vt. 1997).
107. Id. at 574 (citing 47 U.S.CA. § 332(c)(7) (Supp. 1998)).
108. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 97-765 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2261.
109. See In re 960 Radio, Inc., FCC 85-578, 1985 WL 193883 (Oct. 29, 1985).
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FCC has made no such pronouncement about claims
involving the effects of radio frequency emissions. Absent a
clear indication of Congressional intent to preempt such
claims, the courts should retain jurisdiction over disputes
involving the applications of restrictive covenants.
Admittedly, cases such as Graeme,-"° Blackburn v.
Doubleday Broadcasting Company, Inc.,' and Still v.
Michaelsn 2 could induce some courts to find that the FCC's
authority preempts state court jurisdiction over claims that
radio frequency emissions from cell towers violate restrictive
covenants. The better result, however, is for courts to resist
such a temptation and instead find that FCC preemption
extends to zoning authorities' exercise of powers, but not to
enforcement of privately agreed upon restrictive covenants.
D. Options for Opposing CellularTower Construction
Under the 1996 Act
It is, of course, worth remembering that individuals who
are concerned about the placement of wireless towers near
their homes are not limited to enforcing private deed
restrictions when it comes to seeking relief. Obviously, one
alternative starting point for such individuals would be to
encourage state and local authorities to adopt reasonable
regulations governing the placement of such facilities. For
example, it would seem quite reasonable to adopt
requirements that wireless service providers choose nonresidential areas for their facilities, at least where nonresidential properties are available."' However, it may not be
easy for these concerned individuals to secure state or local
government action.
The difficulty in securing state or local action arises out
of the fact that the necessary regulations may be quite
110. 975 F. Supp. 570.
111. 353 N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 1984).
112. 791 F. Supp. 248 (D. Ariz. 1992).
113. A brief article in the Portland Press Herald contains a number of
approaches that county planning boards might employ in addressing the problem
of cell tower proliferation. See Clarke Canfield, Towns and Towers, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, Oct. 16, 1997, at 4E. In his article, Mr. Canfield discusses the
approaches taken by several local authorities: enactment of height limitations on
new tower construction; restriction of new towers to certain zones or areas;
requirement that proponents of a new tower prepare visual impact assessments
and explore the possibility of co-location; and a six-month moratorium so that the
town could study the problem more closely. See id.
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complex,'
and local planning boards may be unable or
unwilling to devote their limited resources to developing
appropriate standards, especially in the absence of a
significant public outcry. Unfortunately, many individuals
tend to be rather passive when faced with issues such as the
proliferation of cell towers. Although many of these
individuals will be upset by proposed placement of a cell
tower near their homes, they often will not lobby planning
commissions and other zoning authorities until such a
proposal is made. In fact, many people are likely unaware of
the proliferation of towers. Furthermore, they may never
have given any thought to the possibility that, with very little
warning, one or more towers could be placed near or in their

community.
Even if a local planning board or other zoning authority
is willing to act, it still takes time to develop the appropriate
standards. One question likely to arise is whether local
planning boards can impose moratoria on the construction of
new towers, pending the development of appropriate
standards."' A number of communities have imposed these
moratoria, despite the fact that the wireless services industry
has often objected to moratoria on the construction of new

facilities." 6

As of the date of this writing, a handful of courts have

114. See, e.g, Planning Department, City & County of San Francisco, Wireless
Telecommunications (WTS) Facilities Siting Guidelines, Aug. 15, 1998 <http:
//www.abag.ca.gov> at <httpJ/www.abag.ca.gov/bayarea/telco/samples/wtsguide.
htm> (detailed guidelines) (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review); see
also Sample Telecomm Documents: A Selection of Local Government Policies,
Ordinances and Contracts Related to Telecommunications, Oct. 4, 1998 <http:
//vww.abag.ca.gov> at <http'//wwv.abag.ca.gov/bayarea/telco/samples/ html> (on
file with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
115. The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association has indicated that
by the end of June 1997 there were 226 tower moratoria in effect across the
country. See Karissa Boney, Getting Over It, WIRELESS WORLD, Oct. 30, 1997,
availablein 1997 WL 10686271.
116. See, e.g., Nynex Mobile Communications Co. v. Hazlet Township Zoning
Bd., 648 A.2d 724 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (challenging a zoning board's
refusal to grant a variance for the construction of a cellular facility in a residential
area); Kingwood Township Volunteer Fire Co. No. One v. Board of Adjustment,
640 A.2d 356 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (concerning an attempt to overturn a
zoning board's denial of a variance to expand the use of a cellular antenna);
Cellular Tel. Co. v. Village of Tarrytown, 624 N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(challenging a tower moratorium); Cellular Tel. Co. v. Rosenberg, 624 N.E.2d 990
(N.Y. 1993) (seeking review of a zoning board's denial of a variance to construct
facilities in a residential district).
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addressed the issue of whether it is legal for a community to
enact a moratorium on cell tower construction-a process
whereby the community's zoning authority gives itself time to
consider a plan for development. The cases are not in
agreement.
The first reported decision concerning the enforceability
of a moratorium on the construction of cell towers was Sprint
Spectrum, L.P., v. City of Medina."' In that case, the District
Court for the Western District of Washington upheld the
propriety of a six-month moratorium on the issuance of
special use permits for wireless communications facilities
notwithstanding the provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.118 However, absent the express time limit on the

moratorium at issue in Medina, there would have been a
different result. In addition, the court in Medina pointed to
the fact that the city had acted quickly to impose the
moratorium following the enactment of the 1996 Act,
something which the court found supported the holding that
the city had acted reasonably.1"9 A state or local government
that takes years to enact a moratorium may well find itself in
a position less favorable than Medina, Washington did in the
event that such a moratorium on tower construction is
challenged.

In fact, in Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Jefferson County,"'
the court distinguished the Medina case and noted that the
city of Medina had issued its moratorium only "five days"
after the 1996 Act had become law. The court in Jefferson
County further emphasized the fact that the Medina
moratorium suspended "only the issuance of permits, not the
processing of applications.""' In addition, the court in
Jefferson County noted that the Medina City Council had
acted pursuant to and in conformity with a state statute
when it enacted its moratorium. 22 By contrast, the Jefferson
County Commission issued not one, but three successive
moratoria; the third one being issued approximately fifteen
months after the Act became law and nearly fourteen months
after the county first adopted purportedly comprehensive
117. 924 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
118. See id. at 1040.
119. Id. at 1037 (noting that the Medina City Council had acted a mere five
days after the Telecommunications Act of 1996 had become law).
120. 968 F. Supp. 1457 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
121. Id. at 1466 (citing Medina, 924 F. Supp. at 1037).
122. See id.
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regulations governing tower construction. 2 3 In addition, the
moratorium at issue suspended not only the issuance of
124
permits, but also "the processing of rezoning applications."
Finally, the court found it important to note that Alabama
state law neither impliedly nor expressly authorized
Jefferson county to do what it had done.The court therefore
found that
2 6 the third moratorium violated the terms of the
1996 Act.
Similarly in Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of
FarmingtonY the court concluded that a nine-month
moratorium on applications for telecommunications facilities,
adopted sixteen months after enactment of the 1996 Act,
violated the 1996 Act. 28 The court in Farmington also
factually distinguished its case from Medina.
The existence of these, and a handful of other cases,
raises some doubt about the viability of moratoria as a means
of controlling cell tower construction. However, assuming
that other courts adopt the reasoning of the court in the
Medina case, a limited moratorium on the granting of
approvals or permits is likely permissible, particularly if the
community adopts the moratorium prior to a particular
wireless service provider making an application for a permit.
However, even if enacted in a timely manner, such a
moratorium will give the community only a narrow window
of time in which to develop reasonable regulations governing
the placement of such towers. Once developed, those
standards may or may not be helpful in limiting the
placement of towers in residential areas. 29
It is therefore quite likely that this entire matter will boil
down to the options that homeowners will have when they
are faced with a proposed tower. These options are of even
greater importance when the local planning regulations fail
to adequately address issues such as aesthetics, effects on
property values and the like.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1465, 1467.
126. See id. at 1468.
127. No. 3:97 CV 863(GLG), 1997 WL 631104 (D. Conn. 1997).
128. Id. at *5.
129. It is clear, for example, that these regulations cannot completely preclude
the provision of wireless services. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (Supp. 1998).
In addition, state and local authorities cannot base their zoning requirements on
the environmental effects of the radio-frequency emissions. See id. § 332(c)(7)(B)
(iv).
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Such a state of affairs is especially likely to arise since
the 1996 Act preempts local zoning authority to regulate the
placement of cell towers on the basis of "environmental
effects." Although the actual meaning of the phrase,
"environmental effects" might be debated, 130 it at least
presents the possibility that Congress has precluded state
and local authorities from considering the safety and health
consequences of the RF emissions from the towers as a basis
for making placement decisions, and has also possibly
precluded those authorities from considering factors
indirectly based on such considerations-such as the impact
on property values stemming from fear of such emissions.!3
One leading alternative to the promulgation and
enforcement of appropriate land use regulations is the
enforcement of restrictive covenants that are already in
place-a subject addressed in detail in the remainder of this
Article. In some cases, courts may interpret existing
restrictive covenants so as to limit the placement of cell

towers in certain neighborhoods."'
130. Neither the Act nor any FCC regulations promulgated thereunder provide
any definition for the phrase "environmental effects." In addition, while the
legislative history speaks in terms of the need to generate a uniform RF
(radiofrequency) standard, there may be room to argue that "environmental
effects" means something different from "health effects." For example, the FCC, in
responding to the "frequently asked questions," has indicated that personal
wireless services providers are indeed required to "consider the effect of their
proposed facilities on the environment... f"FCC FACT SHEET # 2, supra note 21, at
16. In response to this inquiry, the FCC offered regulations requiring licensees to
determine whether the tower is in an officially designated wilderness or wildlife
area, whether the facilities might threaten endangered species or critical habitats
and the like. See id. These concerns seem quite distinct from health issues and
might support the argument that "environmental effects" means something other
than impact on human health. On the other hand, it is possible to take a very
broad approach to defining environmental effects. Wireless service providers are
likely to urge such an interpretation. For example, in Sprint Spectrum L.P. v.
Town ofFarmington,No. 3:97 CV 863(GLG), 1997 WL 631104 (D. Conn. 1997), the
district court found that the local planning commission improperly regulated the
construction of towers on the basis of environmental effects by considering the
effect on property values caused by fear of emissions. Id. at *4.The court reasoned
that any such regulation would be tantamount to indirectly regulating on the basis
of "environmental effects of radio frequency emissions." Id. While the logic of the
district court in Sprint v. Farmington may be subject to criticism, such an
argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
131. See Sprint Spectrum L.P., 1997 WL 631104.
132. Admittedly, the existence of such covenants is happenstance, since they
are likely to have been drafted and adopted prior to the current proliferation of
cellular towers.
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II. THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS To PREVENT THE
CONSTRUCTION OF CELLULAR TOWERS

A. Restrictive Covenants: GeneralRules of Construction
Generally speaking, a restrictive covenant is any
covenant restricting or regulating either the use of real
property or the kind, character and/or location of structures
that may be erected on that property. Restrictive covenants
are usually, although not always, created by a condition,
covenant, reservation or exception in a deed. 3'
While it is often stated that covenants imposing
restrictions on the free use of land are to be narrowly
construed,... it is also generally accepted that this rule of
interpretation is not to be used to defeat the plain purpose of
the restriction.'35 Thus, a general principle in interpreting
restrictive covenants is that the "intention of the parties, as
shown by the covenants, shall govern."' This intent is to be
inferred, where possible, by the "plain meaning" of the
language employed.'
Therefore, if the language of the
restrictive covenant is clear and unambiguous, the language
of the covenant will govern the interpretation of the
restriction. In fact, where a covenant is found to be
unambiguous, it has been held that it should be given
a
8
liberal construction to accomplish its evident purpose.
In the context of using restrictive covenants to oppose the
133. See BALLENTmE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (3d ed. 1969); see generally 20
AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions andRestrictions § 1 (1995).
134. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions §§ 170, 172
(1995); see also Pirtle v. Wade, 593 P.2d 1098 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979).
135. See Midway Properties, Inc. v. Pfister, 354 S.E.2d 926 (S.C. Ct. App.
1987); Holaday v. Fraker, 920 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ark. 1996); see also 20 AM. JUR. 2D
Covenants, Conditions andRestrictions § 171 (1995).
136. McGuire v. Bell, 761 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Ark. 1988). The following list of
citations provides a sample of recent decisions holding that the intent of the
parties must govern the coures interpretation of restrictive covenants: Weeks v.
Kramer, 696 A.2d 361, 362 (Conn. Ct. App. 1997); Gabriel v. Cazier, 938 P.2d 1209,
1211 (Idaho 1997); Stuart v. Chawney, 560 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Mich. 1997); Munson
v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997); Riss v. Angel, 934 P.2d 669,
675 (Wash. 1997); Anderson v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 1996).
137. See Hays v. Watson, 466 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Ark. 1971); see also
Mannweiler v. LaFlamme, 700 A.2d 57 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997), cert. denied, 702
A.2d 641 (Conn. Oct. 16, 1997).
138. See Candlelight Hills Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Goodwin, 763 S.W.2d 474, 477
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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placement of cell towers, the problem presented is that the
large majority of these covenants will not specifically address
the issue of cell towers. Thus, courts will be left to interpret
these covenants in order to determine whether or not the
restrictive covenant precludes this particular use of the land.
The material that follows suggests ways in which some
common restrictions might be interpreted so as to prevent the
placement of cell towers on land burdened by such
restrictions.
B. Limitations on "Offensive" or "Noxious"Trades or
Activities
One very common restrictive covenant prohibits activities
that are "offensive" or "noxious." Although the precise
formulation of such prohibitions may vary,'39 this sort of
covenant may be useful if a wireless service provider
attempts to place a cell tower on land subject to such a
restriction. Unfortunately, there are very few cases that deal
with the question of whether such towers constitute an
"offensive" or "noxious" activity. There is, however, at least
one case holding that such a restriction should apply to
towers.
In Brower v. Hubbard,' the Browers owned a
single-family home in a subdivision called Suburban Acres.
The deed to their property contained restrictive covenants
prohibiting noxious or offensive activities that may be a
nuisance to the neighborhood. The Browers' eighty-seven foot
tower antenna was held to be a violation of these covenants,
and they were ordered to remove it based upon a judicial
determination that their tower/antenna constituted an
offensive activity."
Most jurisdictions, however, have produced no case law
dealing with the issue of whether towers should be
considered "offensive" or "noxious." Thus, it is important to
understand the general meaning of a covenant that restricts
139. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions § 184
(addressing the meaning of "offensive purpose" and similar phrases in restrictive
covenants).
140. 643 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
141. See id.; see also Ronald Benton Brown et al., PropertyLaw: 1995 Survey of
FloridaLaw, 20 NOVA L. REV. 257 (1995) (discussing Brower v. Hubbard);ef Pirtle
v. Wade, 593 P.2d 1098 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979) and infra notes 217-23 and
accompanying text (discussing Pirtle v. Wade).
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"offensive" and/or "noxious" activities, since the ordinary

meaning of such words will likely be persuasive in a lawsuit
involving the interpretation of such a restriction. In light of
the rule that the language of the covenant must control, an
obvious starting point in this analysis is to look at the
ordinary meaning of "offensive" and "noxious."
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary includes
among its definitions of offensive: "cauaing displeasure or
resentment."' "Noxious" is defined to include that which
"constitut[es] a harmful influence.... "143 Black's Law
Dictionaryprovides a definition consistent with the ordinary
meaning of these words. "Offensive," in the context of
nuisances and similar matters, "means noxious, causing
annoyance, discomfort, or painful or disagreeable
sensations."'
"Noxious" is defined as that which is
"offensive" or "[that which causes or tends to cause injury,
especially to health.... ."4'
Under these definitions, cell towers may constitute a
noxious or offensive activity. In fact, cell towers should be
considered as such if the plaintiffs can establish that such
towers are likely to cause displeasure and resentment, or
that they will tend to cause harm. In this analysis, then,, it
would be important for landowners to prove that a proposed
cell tower would adversely affect their quality of life, as well
as their property values.
In fact, case law dealing with what constitutes an
"offensive" or "noxious" activity suggests that this is the
correct approach. In other words, an activity which may
adversely affect the quality of life or the residential nature of
a neighborhood, or which will result in a decrease in property
values, should not be permitted where there is a restriction in
the deed prohibiting offensive or noxious activity.
In Guarjardov. Neece,'46 the deed in question prohibited
any "noxious or offensive trade or activity," and the court
found that a dog kennel would constitute such an activity,
since the property was in a residential neighborhood and it
was possible that operation of a kennel might "diminish...
the quality of life therein and adversely affect... the value of
142. WEBsTER'S NImH NEW CoLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 819 (Merriem Webster
ed., 1983).
143. Id. at 779.
144. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 975 (5th ed. 1979).
145. Id. at 960.
146. 758 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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property.""' Such a test is perfectly consistent with the
ordinary meaning of the terms "offensive" and "noxious."
Using these definitions and this test as a starting point,
what evidence is there that cell towers are in fact "offensive"
or "noxious"? One argument would involve demonstrating
that such towers are associated with adverse health
consequences. If such an argument proved to be true, this
would surely provide compelling evidence that proposed cell
towers are indeed offensive or noxious.
1. Scientific Assessment of Potential Health Risks. A
number of scientific studies have suggested that the
electromagnetic fields ("EMFs") generated by cell phone
and radio frequency antennas or base stations pose a risk to
human health.
At least one residential study has found a statistically
significant link between the incidence of adult leukemia and
proximity to various EMF transmitters. 4 Another study
demonstrated that there was an increased incidence of
various cancers in military personnel who had been exposed
to various RF levels; specifically, the incidence of various
types of leukemia was 3.7 to 13.9 times greater, the incidence
of Hodgkin's disease was three times greater, the incidence of
lymphoma and lymphosarcoma was six times greater and the
incidence of all cancers was two times greater." Similarly, an
article by an Israeli epidemiologist suggests that low-level RF
exposure is associated with mutations, reproductive
complications and cancer. 5 Another article by an Australian
group claims evidence of increased leukemia and childhood
leukemia rates among groups living closer to television
towers. 5 ' In a similar vein, the Los Angeles Times reported
147. Id. at 698.
148. H. Dolk et al., Cancer Incidence Near Radio and Television Transmitters
in GreatBritain, 145 AM. J. EPMEMIOLOGY 10, 12-13, 15 (Jan. 1, 1997) (discussing
the findings of a previous study known as the Sutton Coldfield study).
149. See S. Szmigielski, Cancer Morbidity in Subjects OccupationallyExposed
to High Frequency (Radiofrequency and Microwave) Electromagnetic Radiation,
180 Sci. ToTAL ENvVr 9 (1996). The RF levels evaluated in this study were all below
current FCC hazard thresholds. For a discussion of such thresholds in general, see
infra note 159 and accompanying text.
150. J.R. Goldsmith, Epidemiologic Evidence of Radiofrequency (Microwave)
Effects in Military, Broadcasting, and Occupational Studies, 1 INL
J.
OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. HEALTH 47 (1995).
151. See B. Hocking et al., CancerIncidence and Mortality and Proximity to TV
Towers, 165 MVED. J. AUSTL. 601 (1996).
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an unpublished study conducted by Dr. Eugene Sobel which
indicated that people with high occupational EMF exposure
are at least three times as likely to develop Alzheimer's
disease as those without significant exposure, and that the
number of calcium ions present in nerve cells that were
grown in a laboratory was directly proportional to EMF
exposure.'52 In addition, there are a large and increasing
number of epidemiological studies which have suggested a
possible153 link between RF radiation and various forms of
cancer.

The World Health Organization and the International
Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection jointly
sponsored a recent international seminar on the biological
effects of low-level radio frequency electromagnetic fields.
The seminar was limited to a consideration of the effect of RF
emissions in the range of about 10 MHz to 300 GHz. A recent
report from that seminar indicated that there is a wide
variety of biological effects which can be observed from
exposure to RE emissions at these levels. Included in this
report were studies demonstrating the possible effects on
genes, cell function and cancer promotion, as well as studies
discussing
possible
genotoxic,
immunological
and
carcinogenic effects associated with chronic low-level RF
exposure."' The seminar indicated a strong need for
additional research on populations with residential exposure
from point sources such as broadcasting transmitters, and
specifically concluded that "[r]ecent studies that indicate an
increased incidence of cancer in exposed populations should
be investigated further."'55
One of the most thorough explanations of the possible
effects of EMF exposure can be found in the June 13, 1995
152. Thomas Maugh, Studies Link EMF Exposure to Higher Risk of
Alzheimer's, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 31, 1994, at A36.
153. See e.g., B.S. Anderson & A. Henderson, Cancer Incidence in Census
Tracts with Broadcasting Towers in Honolulu, ST. OF HAW. DEP'T OF HEALTH
PUBLICATION (Oct. 27, 1986); David Savitz et al., Case-Control Study of Childhood
Cancer and Exposure to 60-Hz Magnetic Fields, 128 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 21
(1988); MARIA FEYCHTING & ANDERS AHLBOM, INSTITUTE FOR MILOMEDICIN,
KAROLINSKA INSTITUTET, MAGNETIC FIELDS AND CANCER IN PEOPLE RESIDING NEAR
SWEDISH HIGH-VOLTAGE POWER LINES (1992); Ron Winslow, Magnetic Fields
Linked to Leukemia, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1994, at B7.
154. See M.H. Repacholi,
Low-Level Exposure to Radiofrequency
Electromagnetic Fields: Health Effects and Research Needs, 19 BIOELECTROMAGNETICS 1 (1998).

155. Id. at 1.
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draft report from the NCRP Scientific Committee on
Extremely Low Frequency [ELF] Electric and Magnetic
Fields.156 The NCRP report cites epidemiological studies in
the United States and Europe, which suggest that exposure
to ELF-EMFs has a positive association to childhood cancers,
enhanced cell tumorigenicity and immune deficiencies such
as leukemia. The conclusion of the report states: "Although
incomplete, available epidemiological and laboratory data
share certain consistencies that would link ELF
17
environmental EMFs with increased health risks."
Moreover, even though guidelines have been proposed for
EMF exposure, the report also notes that these "guidelines
proceed on the basis that adverse human health effects from
exposure to ELF electric fields.., have not been established,"
and so "it is apparent that they are not intended to provide
protection against any adverse health effects that may be
caused by such exposure, and they would not do so. " "'
The telecommunications industry would almost certainly
respond to the aforementioned studies and commentaries by
pointing out that most of the research in this field has, to
date, involved RF emissions that are considerably different
from the type of emissions produced by the current
generation of cell towers. Most cell towers will emit RF
radiation in the 825 to 890 MHz range. 9 Most of the existing
studies, however, have dealt with emissions in the 2450 MHz
range. Industry supporters, of course, would likely contend
that those studies dealing with the effects of emissions in the
2450 MHz range do not inform an analysis of emissions in
the 825 to 890 MHz range.
Studies dealing with RFs similar to or within the
spectrum of cell tower emissions may well provide a response
to such criticisms from the telecommunications industry. By
156. See NCRP Draft Recommendations on EMF Exposure Guidelines,
MICROWAVE NEWS, Sept. 26, 1998 <http/-vwww.microwavenews.com> at <http:
//www. microwavenews.com/ncrpl.html> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law
Review).
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Human Exposure to
Radiofrequency Fields from Portable and Mobile Telephones and Other
Communication Devices, Sept. 26, 1998 <httpv/www.ieee.org> at <http:
//www.ieee.org/ usab/documents/fornnllibrary/positions/portable.html> (explaining
that cellular towers utilize radiofrequencies between 825 and 890 MHz)
[hereinafter IEEE-USA Activities Board] (on file with author and the Buffalo Law

Review).
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way of example, one study reported that at 900 MHz (a
frequency extremely close to the frequencies used for cellular
communications systems), an exposure of 50 microwatts per
square centimeter (MW/cm 2 ) caused an 18% reduction in
adults' REM sleep. 6 ' Such a level of exposure is very low,
representing a little more than eight percent of the FCC's
permitted exposure limits. 6 ' The importance of this finding
stems from the fact that REM sleep has been found to be
important in memory and learning functions. Thus, it may be
said that exposure to even low frequencies has potentially
adverse health effects. Such findings may be especially

significant with respect to the health of infants, since: (1)
infants do a great deal of their sleeping during the day and
early evening when power density levels are highest; (2) they
normally sleep long hours so the total REM sleep loss could
be greater than for adults; and (3) their memory and learning
are rapidly developing at this6 2stage of life and thus REM
sleep may be especially critical.
Similarly, one study found that exposure to 835 MHz
EMFs, with certain modulation patterns, "can cause
160. See Petition for Reconsideration, filed before the Federal Communications
Commission in re Guidelines for Evaluating the Environmental Effects of
Radiofrequency Radiation, ET-Docket No. 93-62, FCC Order 96-326, 4.1, Oct. 20,
1998 <httpv/www.cellulartower.com> at <http'/www.cellulartower.com/emission.
htm> (citing to a study reported in the May-June 1994 and May-June 1996 issues
of Microwave News) [hereinafter Petition for Reconsideration] (on fie with author
and the Buffalo Law Review).
161. See id. %4.1 (concluding that the results of a study reported in Microwave
News, see supra note 160, were at these levels); see also Guidelines for Evaluating
the Environmental Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation, 61 Fed. Reg. 41,006 (1996)
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 1, 2, 15, 24, 97) (providing that the FCC's permitted
exposure limits are based on guidelines established by the National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)) [hereinafter Guidelines for RF
Radiation]; National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements,
Biological Effects and Exposure Criteria for Radiofrequency Electromagnetic
Fields, NCRP Report No. 96 (12986) (containing the relevant provisions relied on
by the FCC in its 1996 exposure limits). The FCC has also based its maximum
exposure limits for lower frequency fields on standards promulgated by the
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc. (IEEE); these standards are
generally referred to as the "IEEE C95.1-1991 standards." See Guidelines for RF
Radiation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 41007, 41016. The IEEE C95.1-1991 standards for RF
radiation at frequencies between 825 and 890 MHz range from 2.75-2.97
milliwatts (not microwatts) per square centimeter (mW/cm2 ) for occupational
exposure and 0.41-0.45 mW/cm' for general population exposure. See IEEE-USA
U.S. Activities Board, supra note 159 (providing this particular information from
the IEEE C95.1-1991 standards).
162. See Petition for Reconsideration, supranote 160, 1 4.1.
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significant changes in [ornithine decarboxylase] activity"
when the exposure was only at 63% of the FCC's hazard
threshold. 6 3 These results are consistent with the results of
subsequent research showing that at 2% of the FCC's hazard
threshold, there were significant increases in ornithine
decarboxylase.'" The significance of these results can be seen
in the role which ornithine decarboxylase activity has in
regulating normal cell growth and in potential links to an
increased incidence of cancer. 6 '
Finally, certain research, relying on exposure levels
below the FCC's hazard threshold,
has found a link between
166
cancer and 900 MHz fields.
In addition to these studies that specifically deal with
emissions in or very near to the range of emissions which
would be expected from the current generation of cell towers,
there are other studies that also inform an assessment of cell
towers' RF radiation. For example, a study released in July of
1996 found that 2450 MHz amplitude modulated at 50 Hz
with exposure levels of 100 MW/cm2 (reportedly 3.5% of the
hazard threshold upon which FCC exposure limits are based)
had an impact on the immune systems of laboratory mice."'
The authors of this article noted relevance to mobile
telecommunications "because of the ELF [extremely low
frequency] modulation frequency and field intensity."' This
study may also be particularly important because its results
have been partially validated by other studies that have

163. L. Penafiel et al., Role of Modulation on the Effect of Microwaves on
Ornithine Decarboxylase Activity in L929 Cells, 18 BIOELEOTROMAGNETICS 132

(1997).
164. See C. Byus & L. Hawell HI, Additional Considerations About the
Bioeffects of Mobile Communications, in MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS SAFETY 133
(Niels Kuster et al. eds., 1997). This study also found that exposures to RF
emissions at this level produced significant decreases in the rate at which cell
interiors were able to discharge putrescine. This in turn affects normal cellular
activity-particularly repair functions. See id.
165. See id.
166. See M. Repacholi et al., Lymphomas in Em-piml Transgenic Mice
Exposed to Pulsed 900 MHz ElectromagneticFields, 147 RADIATION RESEARCH 631

(1997) (reporting near 100% increase in lymphoma cancer incidence).
167. See E. Elekes et al., Effect on the Immune System of Mice Exposed
Chronically to 50 Hz Amplitude Modulated 2.45 GHz Microwaves, 17
BIOELECTROMAGNETICS 246 (1996); see also Petition for Reconsideration, supra note
160, 4.3 (observing that this study tested exposure levels that were only 3.5% of
the FCC hazard threshold).
168. See Elekes et al., supranote 167, at 248.
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shown similar effects on sleep patterns.169
Again, the telecommunications industry is likely to
respond to such studies by arguing that the towers are in
compliance with current regulations, and therefore should be
considered safe. Indeed, the argument would continue, the
FCC has promulgated regulations for RF emissions,17 ° and
most proposed cell tower developments will be in compliance
with these regulations. The best response to such an
argument is to attack the very standards that underpin the
relevant FCC regulations.
Again, in order to attack the FCC's regulations on this
matter, one must question the validity of the regulations'
underlying standards. The relevant FCC regulations are
based on standards crafted by the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc. (the "IEEE"), standards that may
themselves be suspect. For example, certain critics have
claimed that the process of developing some of the 1991 IEEE
standards lacked scientific rigor.'7 ' Various participants in
the IEEE standards adoption process have been able to
confirm some of these criticisms. 2 Significantly, two of the
three balloting committee members from federal health
agencies who voted to reject the 1991 IEEE standards
supported their votes by stating that the standards or
process: (1) were "not balanced in representing government,
industry, and the general public"; (2) lacked "agency review
and comment" of a draft; (3) had "very weak justifications" for
exposure increases; and (4) "brushed aside" important papers
showing "pulsed microwaves may give responses at lower
average levels than continuous waves. " " In addition,
representatives from the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), the National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health ("NIOSH") and the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") have objected to claims that the 1991 IEEE limits

169. See Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 160, 4.1 (citing to a study
reported in the May-June 1994 and May-June 1996 issues of Microwave News).
170. See supra note 161.
171. See Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 160, 5 (citing to a report
reprinted in the BiologicalEffects of Electropollution).
172. See Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 160, 5 & n.13 (discussing
the comments that were attached to the ballots of Drs. Mays Swicord and M.
Altman, both of the FDA, wherein each explained their reasons for voting against
adoption of this IEEE standard).
173. See id.; see also id.
5 & n.19 (discussing the IEEE Ballot Committee's
results on project IEEE C95.1-1991).
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are "safe for all."7 4
Finally, there is an argument to be made that the IEEE,
in setting its exposure limits in 1991, disregarded a plethora
of studies showing potential adverse effects at exposure levels
lower than the thresholds that have been adopted as safety
standards. For example, one 1982 study showed various
adverse impacts on the development of cancers at exposure
levels that were only 50% to 75% of the IEEE exposure
limits."5 A 1977 study showed behavioral disruption and
anomalies of the cortex at exposure levels 58% of the IEEE
standards. 6 In a 1978 study, fetal anomalies were
demonstrated at 50% of the IEEE exposure limit.' There
were even studies showing various physiological responses at
levels of 0.15% to 0.25% of the IEEE exposure limits. 8 All of
these studies were available to the IEEE prior to the
adoption of its 1991 standards.
In addition to the studies that were available at the time
the IEEE promulgated its 1991 standards, there are also a
number of pertinent studies that have been published
174. See DAVID FICHTENBERG, AD Hoc ASSOCIATION OF PARTIES CONCERNED
ABOUT THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATION COMMISSION'S RADIOFREQUENCY HEALTH AND
SAFETY RULES, Ex PARTE COMMENTS PERTAINNG TO ET DOCKET 93-62 REGARDING
PETITIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION RULE AND ORDER FCC 96-326 AND
FIRST MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER FCC 96-487, §§ 4.1-4.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2
(1997) (discussing letters from: Margo Oge of the EPA to the FCC (Nov. 9, 1993) in
sections 4.1-4.3, R.W. Niemier of NIOSH to the FCC (Nov. 1, 1993) in section 4.4.1
and L.J. Gill of the FDA, Center for Device and Radiological Health, to the FCC
(Nov. 10, 1993) in section 4.4.2) (on file with Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter Ex
ParteComments].
175. S. Szmigielski et al., Accelerated Development of Spontaneous and
Benzopyrene-Induced Skin Cancer in Mice Exposed to 2450 MHz Microwave
Radiation,3 BIOELECTROMAGNETICS 179 (1982).
176. See Petition for Reconsideration, supranote 160, 14.3.10.
177. Ezra Berman et al., Observations of Mouse FetusesAfter Irradiationwith
2.45 GHz Microwaves, 35 HEALTH PHYSICS 791 (1978).
178. See Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 160,
14.3.13. The author
cites to a study involving lab rats, which linked structural changes in the rats'
brains to microwave exposures that were .15% of the IEEE exposure limits. See id.
"Thus, it was determined that long-term exposure to NMR [nonionizing microwave
radiation] with intensity of 1000 to 10 mW/cm' (3 times a day 40 minutes at a
time, for two months) elicits changes in the... hippocampus... [t]he
demonstrated changes can most probably [affect] their function and constitutes
one of the elements of pathogenesis of early disturbances in people exposed to this
environmental factor." Id. (emphasis added); see also K Oscar et al., Microwave
Alteration of the Blood-Brain-BarrierSystem of Rats, 126 BRAIN RESEARCH 281
(1977) (reporting a variety of effects on the brain at exposure levels equal to 0.25%
of the IEEE maximums).
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subsequent to the IEEE's 1991 standards adoption. Some of
these studies support the contention that the IEEE standards
do not adequately protect human health concerns. These
subsequent studies continue to document the biological
effects of RF exposure at levels below those set in the
standards."9
The most telling criticism levied against the IEEE and
FCC standards, however, may have come from other federal
agencies-agencies charged with protecting the public's
health. As early as 1993, the EPA was expressing concerns
about whether the IEEE standards adequately protected
public health.8 ' The EPA's concern stemmed from the fact
that the IEEE standards were designed only to guard against
thermal effects of the radiation, rather than also guarding
against other possible adverse health effects. In connection
with this criticism, the EPA brought attention to certain
studies purporting to show a link between RF radiation and
cancer.' Similarly, Dr. G.P. Schulte of NIOSH has pointedly
observed that the FCC's exposure standards are based only
'
on preventing "adverse health effects from body heating. 1
In 1993, the FDA told the FCC that "it is unclear what types
and exposure conditions are addressed by
of biological effects
18 3

the standard."

One FDA representative specifically criticized the IEEE
standards by noting that the scientific rationale behind the
standards made little reference to studies dealing with long179. See M. Repacholi et'al., supra note 166 (reporting near 100% increase in
lymphoma cancer incidence); Air Force Microwave-CancerStudy Shrouded in
Mystery, MICROWAVE NEWS, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 13-15 (concerning exposures at 30%
of the FCC's hazard threshold). This report indicated that research performed by J.
Toler showed that "on the basis of palpation... the total of exposed animals with
tumors at the end [of the study] rose to 115, with 88 tumors among the controls."
Id. In spite of these figures, Toler concluded that "tihere was no evidence to
suggest differences in tumor rates between sham-exposed and exposed animals."
Id.; see also Penafiel et al., supranote 163, at 141 (showing "significant changes in
[ornithine decarboxylase] activity" associated with stimulation of cell growth at
exposure levels equal to 63% of the FCC's hazard threshold at 835 MHz); V.
Vorobyov et al., Effects of Weak Microwave FieldsAmplitude Modulated at ELF on
EEF of Symmetric Brain Areas in Rats, 18 BIOELEcTROMAGNETcS 293 (1997)
(showing abnormal EEG pattern in rats during sleep at 8% of the FCC's hazard
threshold).
180. See Ex Parte Comments, supra note 174, § 4.1.
181. See id.
182. See id. § 4.4.1.
183. Id. § 4.4.2 (quoting letter from L.J. Gill of the FDA, Center for Device and
Radiological Health, to the FCC, dated Nov. 10, 1993 regarding ET Docket 93-62).
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term, low-level exposures on animals. This failure apparently
occurred "despite the existence of animal studies that suggest
an association between chronic low level exposure and
acceleration of cancer. Other studies have been published
since finalization of the standard that strengthen this

concern." 184 The FDA also raised concerns regarding the

general lack of available research and evidence concerning
human response to long-term RF exposure. 8 '
Taken together, these studies and comments constitute a
reasonable basis for concern on the part of area residents who
may be troubled by proposed construction of cell towers. As
summarized by two researchers, "[t]here are persistent
indications .

.

.

that these [electromagnetic] fields have

biologic activity, and consequently, there may be a
deleterious component to their action, possibly in the
presence of other factors."'88 While the data is often
inconsistent, inconclusive and difficult to interpret, the
bottom line is that there is evidence to support concerns
about the possible health effects of RF emissions from cell
towers. Indeed, certain scientists have concluded that "the
data cannot be considered sufficient to recommend a
threshold for human tolerance" of chronic low-level RF
emissions.8 7
The limited legal literature on the question of the
potential health consequences associated with cell towers
seems consistent with this position. In one law review article,
the author stated: "The potential health effects of electrical
and magnetic fields ("EMFs") have been a cause for debate
since the 1960's. It is still difficult to predict what effect, 18if8
any, such fields have on the overall health of an organism."
The same author went on to state that "[n]umerous studies
have associated exposure to elevated EMF levels with a
variety of illness including birth defects, miscarriage, and
central nervous system illness. Several well-publicized
studies have linked EMF exposure with certain forms of
184. Id.
185. Id. § 4.4.2.
186. T.E. Aldritch & C.E. Easterly, Electromagnetic Fields and Public Health,
75 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 159, 159 (1987).
187. R.P. Blackwell & R.D. Saunders, The Effects of Low-Level Radiofrequency
and Microwave Radiation on Brain Tissue and Animal Behavior, 50 INT'L J.
RADIATION, BIOLOGY, RELATED STUD., PHYSICS, CHEMISTRY & MED. 761, 761 (1986).
188. John F. Cahill, An Introduction to the Indoor Pollution Problem, 40
PRACTICAL LAW. 27, 50 (1994).

1998]

"NOTIN MY BACK YARD!"

745

cancer, including childhood leukemia."8 9
In the end, the problem is that this subject matter is still
developing, not so much in terms of the law, but in the
scientific community. Indeed, what scientists once thought
was safe may now be subject to significant and serious
questioning. 9 One legal commentator expressed this concern
by noting that while exposure to low levels of EMF "was once
believed to be harmless," "[t]hat view is no longer the
among experts, especially among epidemioloconsensus
191
gists."

The reader should not interpret the foregoing discussion
to mean that there is clear and convincing evidence that cell
tower RF emissions cause an increased incidence of cancer or
other adverse health effects. Nevertheless, the mounting
evidence shows that we do not fully understand either the
precise ways in which these cell towers may adversely affect
human health or the mechanisms that may or will cause such
adverse effects. It is problematic that neither the industry
nor the FCC, in developing standards for RF emissions,
adequately addressed the considerable evidence that is
suggestive of possible health risks. Existing evidence on this
issue seems to support the argument that it is offensive
and/or noxious for the telecommunications industry to force
certain individuals to serve, in effect, as guinea pigs for the
purpose of determining the effects of RF radiation on human
beings.
2. Effects on Property Values. Potential health risks
are not the only reason why construction of towers in
residential areas might be considered offensive or noxious.
A showing that the towers are likely to adversely affect the
property value of surrounding homes should also be
relevant. In this regard, even if one personally disbelieves
the scientific evidence about health risks associated with
the EMF radiation produced by these towers, the public
perception that such risks exist can result in substantial
diminution of property values for surrounding property
189. Id. at 51.
190. For example, lead-based paints, asbestos insulation and recreational
tobacco use are among the dozens of threats to human health that the scientific
community had once regarded as safe, but now understands to be hazardous to
human health.
191. Rufus Young, et al., 1996 Update:ElectromagneticFieldsand Their Land
Use Implications,ALI-ABA COURSE STUDY, Aug. 15, 1996, at 397.
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owners. As one legal commentator has noted, "the public
perception of the EMF risk can itself significantly affect the
value of property."'92
In San Diego Gas v. Daley,9' the court discussed the
scientific controversy about health risks associated with
EMFs. The court pointed out that "[sleveral jurisdictions,
perhaps a majority, have recognized that buyer fear of the
potential dangers associated with power lines, electromagnetic radiation in particular, have a depressing effect on
the market value of adjacent properties."'94 The opinion lists
literally dozens of cases which follow this rule.'95
The reality is that the public does consider such towers to
be dangerous. There are a number of private cases involving
claims of damage from EMF, and the best guess is that such
litigation is likely to increase.
Attorneys, scientists and representatives from private industry
concerned with electromagnetic field (EMF) regulation and
litigation seem to agree on at least two things-there is no
conclusive scientific evidence that EMFs pose a threat to human
health and despite this, or because of this, the number of EMFrelated lawsuits is likely to increase over the next five to 10
196
years.

In fact, as of 1993, there were already approximately
twenty-five EMF personal injury cases before the courts and
an additional twenty or so EM:F property cases in which
alleged health hazards of EMF were raised either in
opposition to construction of new facilities or in support of
higher recoveries for loss of property value.'97
192. Cahill, supra note 188, at 52, citing Power Authority of the State of New
York v. Criscuoloa, 691 N.E.2d 1195 (1993); see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Daley, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1334 (1988).
193. 205 Cal. App. 3d 1334 (1988).
194. Id. at 1346-47.
195. See id. at 1349.
196. Attorneys: More EMF Cases Expected Despite Lack of Strong Science, 2
MEALEY'S LIriG. REP.: ToXIc TORTS 10 (1993).
197. See id. There is substantial evidence that fear of EMF from other sources
has diminished property values. One source estimates that fear of EMF has
resulted in 30% to 40% declines in property values for properties close in proximity
to powerlines. See COMMuNiTy GUIDE TO CELLULAR PHONE TOWERS, supra note 1, at
16. In 1993 the Wall Street Journal reported on a study conducted by a Houston
-appraiser. This appraiser found that certain properties near powerlines were
selling for 13% to 30% less than houses in the same neighborhood that were not
near the powerlines. See Alix M. Freedman, Power-Lines Short-Circuit Sales,
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Potential health risks are not the only reason why
property values will be adversely affected by a proposed cell
tower. There are a number of other factors associated with
such towers which are likely to cause a diminution in
property values, and which independently suggest reasons
why the placement of towers in residential areas should be
considered to be offensive and noxious.
First, there is the problem of aesthetics. Although the
towers can take any number of forms, most often they are
metal monopoles or lattice frame steel structures supported
by guy wires; they can soar up to four hundred feet in
height.'98 One source describes a monopole as "[a] limbless
metal trunk, stretching vertically more than 170 feet and
topped by a tiny pronged platform."'99 Another concludes that
"[tower opponents in residential areas ... should have little
trouble proving the 150- to 200-foot-tall towers are an eyesore
and a threat to property values." °" In fact, virtually no one
contests the fact that these towers are generally visually
unappealing. Some companies have even specialized in the
construction of cell towers which are disguised as a
something other than towers in order to minimize the
unattractiveness of these structures. 201 However, this type of
Homeowners Claim, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1993, at B1.In this same article, the
author related how several homeowners were unable to sell their homes at a price
that even approached appraised value once the powerlines were constructed in
their vicinity. See id.
198. Dean J. Donatelli, Locating Cellular Telephone Facilities:How Should
CommunitiesAnswer When Cellular Telephone Companies Call? 27 RUTGERS L.J.
447, 448 n.2 (1996) ("A monopole or other tower, often ranging from 50 to 400 feet
in height, may be used to mount the antennas unless some other existing structure
such as a water tower, tall building or parking ramp can be used."). Another
source suggests that cellular towers are most often between 100 and 150 feet in
height, and that they can be as tall as 300 feet. See CoMMuNrrY GUIDE TO
CELLULAR PHONE TOWERS, supra note 1, at 17. Furthermore, these towers "can be
ugly and unsightly, especially in areas unaccustomed to tall structures." Id.
199. Susan Scantlin, Cellular Towers, Controversy Sprouts in Hills, ARK.
DEMOCRAT GAZETrE, NORTHWEST ARK. Bus. MATTERS INSERT, May 25, 1997, at 4.
200. Norm Alster, Do Court Battles Loom for PCSs, Telecom Act? INVESTOR'S
Bus. DAiLY, Apr. 6, 1997, at A6.
201. For example, one commentator describes the efforts of one company as
follows: "An Atlanta company specializes in constructing bell towers, clock towers
and artificial trees to house the inner communications working." Scantlin, supra
note 199, at 4; see also Jamie Clary, DigitalTowers Dot the Landscape in Some of
the Strangest Places, NASHVLLE Bus. J., Mar. 24, 1997, at 1 (reporting on the
activities of TeleStructures, Inc., of Atlanta). There have also been stories written
about Specialty Teleconstructors Inc. of New Mexico, which specializes in the
construction of cellular towers. See, e.g., Norm Alster, Phone Guise, INVESTOR'S
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construction is extremely expensive, and wireless services
providers generally plan on putting up plain metal towers,

which will typically soar to a height taller than any
surrounding buildings in order to maximize the range of the
signals sent out from the tower."2 This is cheap, but far from
appealing. In fact, at least one court has commented on the
visual aesthetics as being a particularly significant problem
03
with towers.Y
In addition to these problems which affect all towers, if a
proposed tower will be taller than 200 feet in height, it is also
required to be brightly painted and lit with bright strobe
lights to warn low flying aircraft. °4 This is an obvious and
necessary safety precaution, but it also means that very tall
towers will have to be visible day and night. Undoubtedly, it
will be more than merely unattractive to have these lights
shining in one's windows at night.
In fact, in Adams v. Lindberg,"5 the court considered
Bus. DAILY, Apr. 1, 1997. According to this article, one tactic used by this company
is to hide the "towers among the 'leaves' of steel structures designed to look like
palm trees." Id. One wonders, however, at the effectiveness of these ploys in a
residential area. Certainly in many neighborhoods, even those with very old trees,
there will be no growth or structures which approach 150 feet (which would be the
approximate equivalent of 15 stories). A steel palm tree would be especially
noticeable in many parts of the country. In addition, a bell or clock tower would
likely stick out like a sore thumb in most residential areas.
202. The FCC acknowledges that while camouflaging of towers is technically
feasible, it is "expensive and time consuming and most service providers are
reluctant to routinely use the camouflage option." FCC FACT SHEET # 2, supra note
21, at 7. Moreover, it is also clear that the towers must be taller than surrounding
objects, a fact which makes the success of the camouflaging efforts doubtful.
"Wireless technology has certain requirements. It needs a direct line of sight
between cells, so signals can be handed off. That means cells must be higher than
surrounding trees and roof tops." Dinah Zeiger, Tower Troubles Multiply; City
Councils Taking Action, DENVER Bus. J., Mar. 14, 1997. See also Bob Gardinier, A
Towering Achievement, TIMES UNION (Albany N.Y.), July 28, 1997, at B1 ("The
antennas have to be in line of sight with each other as the frequencies used are
radio waves, which cannot pass around or through obstructions such as trees or
hills.").
203. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Daley, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1334, 1336 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988).
204. "Under authority granted by the Federal Aviation Act, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) has jurisdiction over.., towers that exceed 200
feet in height... The FAA... may require them to be painted and/or illuminated."
CommUNITY GUIDE TO CELLuLAR PHONE TowERs, supra note 1, at 10.; see also
Harriman, supra note 3, at 11A ("[T]owns are being confronted with proposals to
develop cellular towers, some reaching 300 feet into the air. Towers that tall must
be strobe-lit and painted so they can be seen by airplanes both night and day.").
205. Adams v. Lindberg, 610 P.2d 75 (Ariz. App. 1980).
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whether lights intended to illuminate a tennis court would be
an "obnoxious or offensive activity" in violation of a restrictive
covenant. The trial court specifically found that "[t]he use of
these lights at night would be and constitute an annoyance or
nuisance to the neighborhood and the occupants of the
surrounding property." 6 This determination, the appellate
court said, "is supported by the evidence."2 7
Similar findings should apply in the case of towers which
have to be lit by lights that are bright enough to be visible to
low-flying aircraft.
Another issue to consider will be the noise level that cell
towers produce. Towers that use guy wires for stability "hum"
in the wind, quite loudly at times. 8 Even a low-level hum
can detract from peace-of-mind for residents living near a cell
tower.
Finally, it is reasonable to predict that the building of
towers in such residential areas will increase the risk of
children climbing on those towers. This is not only likely to
reduce the market value of properties in the immediate
vicinity of such towers, it is also another reason for
contending that such towers are offensive and/or noxious. As
such, the towers will arguably constitute an offensive
nuisance, which surely should be covered by a restrictive
covenant barring "offensive" or "noxious" trades or activities.
Case law indicates that this reasoning is sound. For
example, in Arkansas Power & Light Company v. Haskins,"9
Arkansas Power & Light Company had condemned a rightof-way across some land owned by John Haskins.21 ° Mr.
Haskins testified that a proposed tower would constitute an
" ' The
attractive nuisance upon which children might climb.21
Arkansas Supreme Court found that Mr. Haskins had the
"right to show every element of damage to his property which
would affect the market value and this was certainly one of
them."2 2
206. Id. at 76.
207. Id.
208. COMMuNiny GUIDE TO CELLULAR PHONE ToWERS, supra note 1, at 17
(noting the noise problems which can be associated with towers). In addition, loud
generators may be needed to power lights and monitor these devices, thus adding
to the noise level. See id.
209. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Haskins, 528 S.W.2d 407 (Ark. 1975).
210. Id. at 408.
211. Id. at 409.
212. Id. (emphasis added).
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C. Prohibitionson "Commercial"Activities
Another relatively common deed restriction in residential
areas is the prohibition of "commercial" trades or activities on
the premises. This type of restriction may be worded in such
a way that it either limits the property to residential
purposes or goes so far as to prohibit commercial trades or
activities expressly. The former restriction would appear to
offer plaintiff landowners the greatest chance of success since
there is virtually no way to argue that a tower is a residential
structure. However, it is at least possible that wireless
service providers might argue that a limitation on
commercial trades or activities does not apply to cell towers
because of the fact that the tower itself is basically a passive
structure, without the normal traffic associated with an ongoing trade or activity.213 If this latter type of restriction is
present, the landowners might argue that the construction
and operation of such towers does constitute a commercial
trade or activity in violation of the restriction. The likely
response to this opposition would be that the tower itself does
not amount to a trade or activity.
It seems reasonably self-evident that these types of
towers are commercial in nature. The rental payments that
service providers make to landowners in return for
permission to locate their facilities in favorable locations
clearly supports this conclusion. For example, one source has
reported that cell and wireless service providers have paid up
to $5000 a month to rent space at which they can locate
equipment. 14 One location in Columbia, Maryland is reported
to generate gross rents of $60,000 to $70,000 per year,
because of its location on a hill. 15 In addition, the operation of
towers at commercial levels suggests that there will be a
degree of required maintenance which will support the
conclusion that these towers are commercial in nature.
Certainly they are profit-making for the wireless service
213. This argument could be made in connection with a restrictive covenant
prohibiting offensive "trades or activities," as well as in connection with the issue
of whether construction and operation of a cellular tower is a "commercial" trade or

activity.
214. See Lon Singer, Look Before You Lease: Telecommunications Providers
FindingSpace up on the Roof, WEST'S LEGAL NEws, Dec. 13, 1996, at 1.0, available
in 1996 WL 711733. Another source estimates that the usual rental for space on
which to locate a cellular tower is a minimum of $400 per month. See Clary, supra
note 201, at 1.
215. Singer, supra note 214, at 2.0.
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providers.216
A less obvious question is whether the placement and
operation of cell towers is in itself a "trade or activity," as
commonly required by these sorts of restrictive covenants.
Unfortunately, there is relatively little case law dealing with
this particular issue.
One case which does offer some insight into this issue is
Pirtle v. Wade.2 "7 In Pirtle, the defendant had attempted to
place a radio antenna on his house lot as part of his ham
radio operator hobby."8 Several of his neighbors sought to
enjoin this on the basis that the antenna would violate one or
more of the restrictive covenants on the land. The restrictive
covenants in question included a requirement that lots be
used only for residential purposes and that no noxious or
offensive trade or enterprise be allowed upon the lots in
question."9 The court found that this particular antenna was
associated with a hobby, which was not income-producing
and therefore not in violation of the residential limitation on
the land.22 In addition, the court interpreted the second
restriction as connoting "some activity rather than the
existence of a radio antenna. While this construction is not
absolute, it is supported by the injunction to resolve2 2all
'
doubts in favor of the unencumbered use of real property."
Obviously, there are significant differences between the
situation in Pirtle and the case of a landowner seeking to
prevent the construction of a cell tower on nearby property.
First, although the Pirtle court never recited the size of the
proposed radio antenna other than a single reference to it as
being 'large," it was described as an antenna rather than a
tower.222 It is un]ikely that the antenna was comparable to a
commercial cell tower in height or mass, and it was certainly
216. One source has put cellular industry sales at $20 billion per annum, and
estimates this figure to be growing at a rate of more than 30% per year. See Jeff
Sturgeon, How To Deal with Towers Is a Tough Call, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, Oct. 6, 1996, at 1. Even if there is not much of an issue about towers put up
by the telecommunications industry, the question of whether or not a tower is
commercial in nature may be a significant issue for other types of towers. See
Perry v. Spavale, 828 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. 1992); see also infra notes 235-40 and
accompanying text (discussing Perry v. Spavale).
217. Pirtle v. Wade, 593 P.2d 1098 (Okla. 1979).
218. Id. at 1099.
219. See id. at 1100.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1099-1100.
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dissimilar in that the antenna was not producing income.223
D. MiscellaneousRestrictions that Might Apply to Cellular
Towers
By no means is the foregoing intended to be an exclusive
listing of the possible restrictive covenants that might
provide a basis for challenging a proposed cell tower. For
example, there are apparently a number of neighborhoods
across the country where the lots are subject to restrictive
covenants limiting the rights of homeowners to build towers,
antennas or the like. 4 An express restriction on towers
should be clearly applicable in the case of a proposed cell
tower.
Restrictive covenants requiring building approval prior to
the construction of structures on lots may also apply to cell
towers. Although there are not many reported decisions
dealing with this issue, case law does generally support the
notion that towers are in fact the kind of "structures" or
"buildings" to which restrictive covenants are designed to
apply, especially when the covenants were designed to
preserve the residential character of a neighborhood.
For example, in La Vielle v. Seay,"2 one issue was
whether a 64-foot tower to be used for domestic television
reception and for ham radio transmitting was a "structure"
within the meaning of the word as used in subdivision
restrictions.226 The restriction provided that it was the
intention of the grantors to restrict their subdivision only to
residences of "real architectural merit, good design and
suitable material," and therefore the plans and specifications
for the erection or alteration of any building, fence, wall or
other "structure" had to be approved, in writing, by the
original grantors or their authorized representatives.227
Notwithstanding the argument that the covenant could not

223. See supranotes 198-204 and accompanying text for a description of towers
and associated facilities; Donatelli, supra note 198, at 448 n.2 (describing towers as
being between 50 and 400 feet in height).
224. See generally Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, Radio or Television
Aerials, Antennas, Towers, or Satellite Dishes or Discs as Within the Terms of
Covenant Restricting Use, Erection, or Maintenance of Such Structures Upon
Residential Property, 76 A.L.R.4th 498 (1990).
225. La Vielle v. Seay, 412 S.W.2d 587 (Ky. 1966).
226. Id. at 593.
227. Id. at 591.
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be applied to the proposed tower because such towers had
been unknown at the time when the covenant was drafted
and imposed on the land, the court found that the clear
import of the restriction was that such towers would be
"structures" subject to these approval requirements.228
Black Horse Run Property Owners Association-Raleigh,
Inc. v. Kaleel2 9 is a particularly interesting case because the
appellate court affirmed a judgment requiring property
owners to dismantle and remove three radio towers, each of
which were at least one hundred feet tall. The restrictive
covenants in that case were quite detailed. In pertinent part
they provided that: (1) lots were limited to residential
purposes; (2) an architectural control committee; had to preapprove every "structure or fence or wall"; (3) the only
permitted "structures" were one detached single family
dwelling, a stable, and other accessory buildings as allowed
by the architectural control committee and (4) the only
"structures" which could be constructed prior to the main
building were a stable, barn and fence.
The owners of the towers admitted that they had not
obtained the approval of the architectural control committee,
but they contended that the restrictive covenants did not
apply to the towers which they had constructed. 1 The
appellate court rejected the contention of the tower owners
that the term "structures" was ambiguous and also found
that there was no need for the trial court to have made
findings of fact with respect to the meaning that the parties
intended the term to have.232 The court pointed out that
under generally accepted definitions, a "structure" is
something that is constructed or built.2 33 Therefore, the court

said, a radio tower comes within this definition.2 34 Thus, the
228. This case actually reversed the trial court's judgment permanently
enjoining property owners from erecting the tower on their residential property,

but did so only on the grounds that the trial court should have decided the case on
the merits rather than sustaining motions for judgment on the pleadings. See id.
at 591.
229. Black Horse Run Property Owners Ass'n-Raleigh, Inc. v. Kaleel, 362
S.E.2d 619 (N.C. 1987).
230. Id. at 620.
231. See id. at 621.
232. Id. at 622 (defining "structure" as "something constructed or built"); see
also Watson Indus. v. Shaw, 69 S.E.2d 505 (N.C. 1952) (holding that it is "beyond
question" that a radio tower is a structure).
233. Black HorseRun PropertyOwners, 362 S.E.2d at 622.
234. Id.
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tower owners should have obtained approval of the towers as
required by the terms of the covenants.
In Perry v. Spavale,25 there were a number of restrictive
covenants affecting the land in question. The most relevant
restrictions were that lots were to be used for residential
purposes only, that any building had to be approved by the
trustees, and that noxious and offensive activities were
prohibited.236 The trial court enjoined the construction of a
radio transmission tower which would have been 120 feet in
On appeal, the defendants argued that the
height.3
restriction was over-broad in that it prohibited the radio
tower not just for commercial purposes, but also for use in
connection with a ham radio hobby.3 8 Declining to venture
into a detailed discussion of the commercial/private use
problem, the court concluded that the radio tower was a
"building" subject to the requirement that it be approved by
the trustees, as called for in the restrictive covenants.239 The
court therefore affirmed the injunction against construction
of the proposed tower.24 °
Homeowners might also oppose the construction of cell
towers on the basis of covenants prohibiting the construction
of buildings or structures other than a single family dwelling
or those on a specified list of approved structures, such as
fences, swing sets or the like. Again, case law generally
supports the application of this type of restrictive covenant to
towers.
241 the issue was whether a 125In Mitchell v. Gaulding,
foot tall radio tower violated a restrictive covenant expressly
prohibiting the erection or placement of any "structure" on
any lot other than one detached single family dwelling, a
garage for not more than three cars and outbuildings
necessary for typical single family use.242 Affirming a
judgment ordering removal of the tower, the court concluded
that the word "structure" was used in a broad sense and
included the subject radio tower.243 The court reasoned that
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

828 S.W.2d 709, 710 (Mo. 1992).
See id. at 710.
See id. at 710-11.
See id. at 711.
Id. at 711-13.
See id. at 713.
483.S.W.2d 41:(Tex. 1972).
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 43.
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the restrictive covenant as a whole showed an intention to
develop and maintain a subdivision of first-class, single
family residences.2
Similarly, in Parker v. Hough,245 a group of developers of
and lot owners in a residential development sued to enforce
restrictive covenants against another lot owner who had
erected a radio tower as part of his hobby as a ham-radio
operator.246 In that case the radio tower was normally
maintained at a height of fifty feet above the ground and had
a television antenna on the top."' The developers and
neighbors maintained first that the tower was an
"objectionable structure" within the meaning of a provision in
the restrictions prohibiting billboards or any other
objectionable structures erected or maintained on any lot
subject to the restrictions.248 The radio-antenna owner
contended that the restriction contained no definition of or
standard for an "objectionable" structure and was therefore
indefinite, ambiguous and unenforceable.249 The trial court
disagreed, finding that the tower was unsightly and
objectionable.25 The appellate court affirmed, concluding that
where the language of a deed or a restriction is not clear,
then in order to ascertain the intention of the parties its
language should be interpreted in the light of the subject
matter, the apparent object or purpose of the parties and the
conditions existing when it was made.25
In that case, the plaintiffs also contended the tower
violated a restriction which provided that no structure other
than a single family-unit dwelling and an accompanying
garage could be erected on any building lot.52 The
radio-antenna owner responded that rather than barring his
right to build a radio tower, this portion of the restriction
specifically permitted accessory structures, including by
implication his tower. 3 Upon reviewing the covenant at
issue, the court found that it enumerated the following

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See id.
215 A.2d 667 (Pa. 1966).
Id. at 668-69.
See id. at 669.
Id. at 668-69 (providing the exact language of the restriction).
Id. at 670.
See id. at 669.
See id. at 670.
See id. at 668.
See id. at 670.
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permitted structures: a small tool house, a play house, an
outdoor fireplace, a paved outdoor living area with adjacent
fences, arbors, "etc."; provided such enumerated "structures"
did not exceed twelve feet in height.254 The court explained
that the word "etc." was undoubtedly used in this deed to
connote structures of the same kind or class as those which
were specifically enumerated and could not reasonably be
interpreted to mean or include a radio tower fifty feet in
height.255
This case might also be relied upon to support the
proposition that a height restriction on buildings or other
structures ought to apply to towers. Since this type of
restrictive covenant is not that uncommon, particularly in
residential subdivisions,25 this type of restriction would also

be worth considering when wireless service providers propose
to locate cell towers in residential areas.
One recent case, however, does conclude that a monopole
antenna may not be a "building" for all purposes. In Bell
Atlantic Nynex Mobile, Inc. v. Lonergan,257 the court held that

a monopole antenna was not a "building" for purposes of
imposing a building height limitation in a local zoning code.255
However, the zoning code in question specifically defined
building as "any structure having a roof supported by
columns or similar supports or walls and intended for the
shelter, housing or enclosure of persons, animals or
chattels."259 The fact that this result was reached in
connection with the interpretation of a zoning ordinance
which included a narrow definition should distinguish it from
cases where the legal issue is the applicability of privately
imposed restrictive covenants which may not include such a
narrow definition. Certainly the case should have no
application at all to restrictions that are imposed upon all
structures rather than being limited to buildings.
In fact, whenever landowners seek to oppose the
construction of cell towers, the landowners' representatives
should carefully evaluate any restrictive covenant to see if it
provides a potential basis for opposing the construction.
254. 215 A.2d 667, 668 (Pa. 1966).
255. Id. at 670-71. 1256. See Thomas R. Trencher, Annotation, Restrictive Covenants as to Height
of Structuresor Buildings, 1 A.L.R.4th 1021 (1980).
257. 659 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
258. Id. at 405.
259. Id. at 403.
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III. STANDING To ENFORCE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

The issue of who has standing to enforce the terms of
private deed restrictions is an issue that grows directly out of
the conclusion that restrictive covenants can operate as
powerful tools in the hands of those opposed to the
construction of cell towers in their neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, this can often be a complicated issue. So
complicated, in fact, that a number of annotations have been
prepared on the subject over the years.26 ° However, as one
source has explained, "[riestrictive covenants are designed to
enhance the value and marketability of property; they are
intended to be binding conditions of mutual benefit to the
grantor and grantee."2 Thus, it is generally true that such
restrictions are enforceable against initial and subsequent
grantees,26 by anyone in the chain of title from the original
grantor who imposed the restrictions.263 Generally speaking,
then, in the case of restrictive covenants designed to protect
the value or character of property in a neighborhood,
enforcement powers typically extend not only to the parties to
the contract,
but also to "their heirs, devisees, or express
"264
assigns.
Thus, if restrictive covenants are placed on lots in a
subdivision, or even on other lots which are not included in a
subdivision as such, anyone in the chain of title from the
landowner or developer who originally imposed the
restrictions, as well as the original developer, ought to have
standing to enforce the covenants.
On the other hand, these rules also mean that
individuals in a subdivision different from the land on which
a wireless service provider proposes to locate a cell tower will
probably not have standing to enforce restrictive covenants,
even if their land is extremely close to the proposed
construction. Take for example the situation which faced the
260. See Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Who May Enforce Restrictive
Covenant or Agreement as to Use of Real Property,51 A.L.R.3d 556 (1973); see also
Annotation, Covenant Restricting Use of Land, Made for Purpose of Guarding
Against Competition, As Running with Land, 25 A.L.R.3d 897 (1969); Annotation,
Affirmative Covenants asRunning with the Land, 68 A.L.R.2d 1022 (1959).
261. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants § 150 (1995).
262. See id. § 151.
263. See id. § 251.
264. Brunner, supra note 260, at 560; see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES § 552 (1944).

758

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Arkansas courts in Rickman v. Mobbs 5 That case involved
two subdivisions, which were acquired "at different times
from different owners, platted... into lots at different times,
and disposed of... at different times ....

')2

66

The plaintiffs

who were seeking to enforce the deed restrictions were the
owners of land in one of the subdivisions; the defendant
owned land in the other subdivision. The court refused to
allow the plaintiffs to enforce the restriction because they
were not in the chain of title to land in the subdivision with
the restrictive covenant at issue. Although the court refused
to allow those plaintiffs to sue, it did note that "[tihere is no
doubt that the purchaser of land covered by a bill of
assurance is entitled to have the reciprocal obligations of
restrictions thus established enforced against the owners and
purchasers of other lands subject to the same bill of
assurance. 2 67 Outsiders, however, have no such rights.

Generally speaking, if a wireless service provider
proposes to locate a cell tower in a given subdivision, other
landowners in the same subdivision should have standing to
enforce any applicable restrictive covenants, absent waiver or
abandonment. 8 If the land is not in a subdivision, the
question is likely to be whether the plaintiffs land and the
defendant's land were originally owned together by a single
owner; an owner who imposed restrictive covenants on both
tracts of land. Thus, even if the original grantor or developer
is no longer in the picture, neighboring landowners may well
have standing to sue to enforce any applicable restrictive
covenants.
IV. PRE-EXISTING TOWERS: THEIR EFFECT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW TOWERS

One potential problem with relying on restrictive
covenants to prevent the construction of new cell towers is
that wireless service providers may strategically choose areas
in which other towers already exist. In fact, this specific
advice is sometimes given to those in the wireless services
industry as one way in which to facilitate approval of
265.
266.
267.
268.

Rickman v. Mobbs, 490 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1973).
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
For a discussion of the issues of waiver and abandonment see infra Part
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proposed construction.269 The issue that this raises for

potential plaintiffs is whether the failure to object to
preexisting towers or similar structures will operate as a bar
to claims against additional towers.
To some extent, it is difficult to speak in generalities
about whether this amounts to waiver or abandonment of a
particular covenant, because "[a] number of jurisdictions may
have rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or
legislative enactments directly bearing upon this subject."27 °
However, it is well established that the mere fact that area
property owners have acquiesced in other violations of a
restrictive covenant does not automatically amount to
abandonment, waiver, estoppel or laches.27'
For example, it is quite clear that failure to object to
insignificant or distant violations will not preclude the
enforcement of a covenant against a violation which is
significant and nearby.272 Consistent with this rule, it has also
been held that a waiver does not result unless and until there
have been general and multiple violations without protest.27 3
In fact, a covenant cannot be considered abandoned unless it
has been shown that the restrictions have "been violated to
such an extent as to reasonably lead to the conclusion that
[they have] in fact been abandoned."274
In addition, a number of authorities have concluded that
waiver occurs only "where, by failing to act, one leads another
to believe that he or she is not going to insist upon the
covenant and such other person is damaged thereby.... .275 It
is also clear that there can be no waiver in the absence of
269. For example, the FCC advises that 'wireless service providers may be
able to expedite the zoning authorization process if they target, where possible, site
locations that are compatible with the proposed use.... " FCC FACT SHEET # 2,
supranote 21, at 7.
270. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Waiver of Right to Enforce Restrictive Covenant
by Failureto Object to Other Violations, 25 A.L.R.5th 123, 142-43 (1995).
271. See Ingram v. Wirt, 869 S.W.2d 685 (Ark 1993); Welchman v. Norman,
841 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ark. 1992) ("the mere showing of other violations does not
always constitute acquiescence or waiver of the restrictions.").
272. The rule is that landowners "are entitled to ignore inoffensive violations of
[a] restriction without forfeiting their right to restrain others which they find
offensive." Gordon v. Village of Lawrence, 443 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981) (multiple citations omitted); see also 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants § 240 (1995).
273. See Harris v. Pierce, 73 So. 2d 330 (La. 1954).
274. 20 AM. JUR.2D Covenants § 238 (1995).
275. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants § 329 (1995); see also Zmotony v. Phillips, 529
S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1975); Ballard v. Kitchen, 36 S.E.2d 390 (W.Va. 1945).
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knowledge of the facts upon which the waiver is based.276
In the case of newly proposed cell towers, these rules
provide potential plaintiffs with several arguments if they
want to oppose a new tower even though one or more existing
towers are already located in the area.
First, if the other towers are smaller, different in
character or further away from the plaintiffs' homes, the
plaintiffs can argue that the new tower is a violation which is
different in kind and character from the prior violations.
Thus, the preexisting towers should be disregarded in
connection with the current opposition to the proposed tower.
The greater the distinctions which can be made, and the
more the plaintiffs can show that the proposed tower is a
more significant burden on the land than the existing
structures, the stronger this argument will be.
In addition, in most jurisdictions, neighbors will be
notified prior to the construction of any proposed tower. If the
neighbors act quickly to enforce the restrictive covenant,
especially if they can act before actual construction has
begun, it will be difficult for the tower's proponent to claim
that it has been damaged by any failure to enforce the prior
restrictions. Thus, the faster landowners act to protect their
rights, the greater their chances of success.277
Finally, it should also be possible to argue that the
doctrine of waiver should not apply to current proposals if the
preexisting towers were constructed several years ago before
the emergence of so much literature informing individuals of
the potential health risks and potential damage to property
values. The fact is that much of the information suggesting
the link between EIF and various health risks is very new.
As
mentioned
earlier,
legal
commentators
have
acknowledged the shift in scientific evidence, pointing out
that the once-common belief that low levels of EMF are
harmless "is no longer the consensus among experts,
especially among epidemiologists." 278 In fact, most of the
available studies which suggest that there are health risks
associated with low levels of EMF were reported in either the
late 1980s or the 1990s, and the bulk of such information was
276. See Wald v. West MacGregor Protective Ass'n, 332 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.
1960).
277. See COMMUNITY GUIDE TO CELLULAR PHONE TOWERS, supra note 1, at 18
('The most important part of opposing tower and antenna siting is to get your voice
heard early.").
278. Young et al., supranote 191, at 397.
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reported in just the last three or four years. Thus,
homeowners should also argue that when the existing towers
were constructed, area residents did not and could not have
known of the health risks and the attendant negative effect
on property values.
While the issue of waiver may be significant, it should
not be automatically assumed that the presence of other
towers in the vicinity necessarily means that an attempt to
prevent additional construction will be futile. The doctrine of
waiver is complex and is likely to require a consideration of
the special facts of each case. There are, however, a number
of potential arguments that might be made in support of the
proposition that failure of landowners in the area to object to
prior towers should not preclude them from enforcing a
restrictive covenant against the construction of a new tower.
CONCLUSION

Ideally, private landowners should not have to rely on the
existence of private restrictive covenants to protect the
quality of their lives, the character of their neighborhoods
and the value of their property. These issues represent some
of the primary justifications for the existence of planning
boards and similar bodies generally responsible for the
promulgation and enforcement of suitable land use
regulations.
Unfortunately, the reality of the situation is that in many
communities, these authorities are inadequately prepared to
protect private citizens against the potential disadvantages
caused by the rapid proliferation of cell towers. Planning
boards have simply not had the time or, in many cases, the
resources to develop adequate rules. They are also limited by
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which precludes state
and local authorities from making siting decisions based on
the "environmental effects" of the radio frequency emissions
of such towers. 79 Thus, landowners who find out that one of
their neighbors has leased his or her land to a wireless
service provider so that the provider can construct a cell
tower in the area are likely to be in need of alternatives if
they wish to oppose the construction of the tower in their
neighborhood. The strategy of relying on restrictive
covenants, as discussed in this Article, provides these
279. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv); supranotes 15-22 and accompanying text.
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landowners with at least one way in which to oppose the
construction of cell towers.

